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Abstract 
 
 Evidence is examined concerning the coherence of divine foreknowledge as 
defined by Arminianism and Molinism. Arminianism argues that God has complete and 
infallible knowledge of the future, and attempts to simultaneously maintain a strong view 
of libertarian freedom. Molinism agrees with the Arminian stance on foreknowledge and 
human freedom, but argues that middle knowledge must also be posited for God to have 
strong providential control over His creation. It is argued that Molinism better accounts for 
the biblical data and provides a more coherent theological and philosophical position, since 
Arminianism cannot provide a strong theory of providential control. Subsequently, a 
defense is given for Reformed Molinism, which combines Molinism with Robert Kane’s 
event-causal version of libertarian freedom.  
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Arminianism and Molinism on Divine Foreknowledge 
Throughout church history, Christians have commonly held that God has complete 
knowledge of the future, commonly known as divine foreknowledge. This naturally 
developed from the doctrine of omniscience: if God knows all true propositions, and there 
are true propositions about the future, then God must have divine foreknowledge. However, 
skeptics concerning divine foreknowledge have challenged this line of reasoning by 
arguing that God’s omniscience does not include complete knowledge of the future. 
Consequently, theologians and philosophers have attempted to defend the traditional 
understanding of divine foreknowledge against new objections. In this study, these 
defenses of divine foreknowledge will be examined, with the goal of finding which view 
is the most biblically consistent and theologically/philosophically coherent. Specifically, 
Arminianism and Molinism will be thoroughly scrutinized. As a result of this investigation, 
Reformed Molinism seems to be the most theologically/philosophically coherent position. 
I. Arminianism 
A. Arminian Definition of Divine Foreknowledge 
 Arminianism argues for the traditional understanding of divine foreknowledge, 
which says that God has “complete and infallible knowledge of the future.”1 This definition 
of divine foreknowledge is also called “simple foreknowledge”, because Molinists accept 
God’s complete and infallible knowledge of the future while also affirming God’s middle 
knowledge. In defending simple foreknowledge, Arminians represent the most common 
view of divine foreknowledge throughout church history as well as the most common 
                                                     
 1. David Hunt, “The Simple-Foreknowledge View,” in Divine Foreknowledge: Four Views, edited 
by J.K. Beilby and P.R. Eddy (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2001), 65. 
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interpretation of the biblical data. In distinction from Calvinism, which holds that God 
foreknows because He foreordains, Arminius argued that  
God foreknows future things through the infinity of his essence, and through the 
pre-eminent perfection of his understanding and prescience, not as he willed or 
decreed that they should necessarily be done, though he would not foreknow them 
except as they were future, and they would not be future unless God had decreed 
either to perform or to permit them.2  
 
Though the content of what God knows is agreed upon by Arminians and Calvinists, how 
God knows the future has been fiercely debated since the time of Arminius and Calvin. 
B. Biblical Evidence for Arminianism 
 Throughout the Old Testament, the prophets and kings consistently declare God’s 
knowledge of and mastery over the future. In Psalm 139, David proclaims that “before 
there is a word on my tongue, Behold, O Lord, You know it all … And in Your book were 
all written / The days that were ordained for me, When as yet there was not one of them.”3 
This psalm not only attests to God’s foreknowledge of David’s words, but also His control 
over David’s entire future. Similarly, 1 and 2 Kings have an entire promise-fulfillment 
motif, with many of these promises involving the free choices of human beings.4 By 
                                                     
 2. Jacob Arminius, “Certain Articles To Be Diligently Examined And Weighed Because Some 
Controversy Has Arisen Concerning Them Among Even Those Who Profess The Reformed Religion,” in 
The Works of Jacob Arminius, vol. 2, translated by James Nichols (Buffalo, NY: Derby, Orton, and Mulligan, 
1853), accessed January 21, 2017. http://wesley.nnu.edu/arminianism/the-works-of-james-arminius/volume-
2/controversial-articles-of-faith/. 
 
3. Verses 4, 16. 
  
4. Roy provides the following examples: 1 Kings 11:34-37 cf. 1 Kings 12:20 and 2 Kings 8:19; 1 
Kings 13:2 cf. 2 Kings 21:26, 22:8-13, 23:3; 1 Kings 16:2-4 cf. 16:11-12; 1 Kings 17:13-16; 1 Kings 21:19 
cf. 22:29-38; 1 Kings 21:23 cf. 2 Kings 9:6-10, 35-36, 10:17; 2 Kings 7:1-2, 16-20; 2 Kings 20:17-18 cf. 
24:12-14; 1 Kings 13:5; Josh. 6:26 cf. 1 Kings 16:34; 2 Kings 1:16-17; 2 Kings 2:21-22; 2 Kings 4:43-44; 2 
Kings 10:30 cf. 15:12; 1 Kings 14:5-6; 1 Kings 20:22, 26; 1 Kings 22:22, 28-40; 2 Kings 3:18-19, 24-25; 2 
Kings 8:13, 15; 2 Kings 19:32-36. See S.C. Roy, How Much Does God Foreknow? A Comprehensive Biblical 
Study (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2006). 
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emphasizing the fulfillment of God’s promises, the author of 1 and 2 Kings is arguing for 
God’s covenantal faithfulness during the tumultuous years of infighting and bloodshed.5 
Outside these two books, predictive prophecy is a prominent feature of the Old Testament, 
whether it addresses certain actions of the Israelites, future judgment from Yahweh, or the 
Messiah’s arrival. Since this genre is so prevalent, it would be futile to try to cite every 
example of it.6 Consequently, the primary example will be Isaiah 40-48, which explains 
why God uses predictive prophecy so frequently. 
 In Isaiah 40-48, God puts Israel and its idols on trial. As the prosecutor, God argues 
that Israel has turned away from Him, the true God, to serve false deities. In order to 
distinguish Himself as the true and living deity, God challenges the idols to predict the 
future: “Let them bring forth and declare to us what is going to take place; As for the former 
events, declare what they were, that we may consider them and know their outcome. Or 
announce to us what is coming; Declare the things that are going to come afterward, that 
we may know that you are gods.”7 God is grounding His own claim to deity on His ability 
to proclaim the future; to prove Himself worthy of allegiance, God says that He will bring 
forth Cyrus to rule as king and that He will deliver Israel from foreign captivity.8 
                                                     
5. Roy argues that “These numerous and widely varied examples from 1-2 Kings convincingly 
demonstrate that the prophets of Israel are indeed predictors of the future. They can do so as spokespersons 
of Yahweh, precisely because Yahweh does in fact know both the near and distant future. And he knows all 
of the future, including the future free decisions of human beings. Thus to be true to the overwhelming 
teaching of 1-2 Kings, we must affirm that the foreknowledge of Yahweh is truly exhaustive.” See How Much 
Does God Foreknow, 43. 
 
6. Roy records 2,323 predictive prophecies in both the Old and New Testaments in How Much Does 
God Foreknow. 
 
7. Isaiah 41:22-23. 
  
8. Cf. 41:25-28; 42:8-9; 43:9-12; 44:7-8; 44:26-45:6, 20-21; 46:9-11; 48:3-11. 
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Importantly, this prophecy involves hundreds of human choices, including the monumental 
task of appointing Cyrus as king. Since God is staking His position as God of Israel on His 
own ability to prophesy the future, it would be ludicrous to claim that God lacks exhaustive 
foreknowledge of all events, including human choices. 
 Jesus makes a similar claim in the Gospel of John during the Passover meal. 
Throughout His ministry, Jesus made several predictions about His future death at the 
hands of the scribes and Pharisees, since he was trying to explain why His mission as 
Messiah would defy contemporary Jewish expectations.9 Subsequently, Jesus gave the 
following test for His own messianic claims: “From now on I am telling you before it 
comes to pass, so that when it does occur, you may believe that I am He.”10 In other words, 
Jesus states that if His predictions come true, then the disciples will know that He really 
was the Messiah. He then predicted the betrayals of both Peter and Judas, which involved 
the free decisions of both men. Just like God in Isaiah 40-48, it makes no sense for Jesus 
to rest His messianic claim on His own ability to foreknow events if He lacked divine 
foreknowledge. 
 Finally, several passages explain how God’s plan of salvation was decided before 
the foundation of the world.11 This plan involves thousands of free human choices, if not 
millions. To say that God lacks exhaustive divine foreknowledge simply ignores passages 
which clearly describe God foreknowing people. Once one combines the predictive 
                                                     
9. Cf. John 2:19-22; Matt. 16:21; 17:22-23; 20:17-19; Mark 8:31; 9:31; 10:33-34; Luke 9:22, 44; 
18:31-33. 
 
10. John 13:19. 
 
11. Cf. Rom. 8:29-30; 1 Pet. 1:2, 18-20; Eph. 1:3-14; 3:11; 1 Cor. 2:7; 2 Tim. 1:9-10; Rev. 13:8; 
17:8. 
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prophecies; God and Jesus both staking their identity claims on their ability to know the 
future; and the other passages describing God’s foreknowing certain people and actions; it 
becomes exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to deny exhaustive divine foreknowledge. 
C. Theological Evidence for Arminianism 
 Arminians argue that God’s foreknowledge makes the best sense of prayer, divine 
guidance, and hope in God’s ultimate triumph over evil. In each of these areas, exhaustive 
divine foreknowledge provides greater assurance of God’s promises. First, God knows the 
outcomes of human prayers; He knows what trials we will face and which blessings will 
come to fruition. This naturally leads to more trustworthy guidance from God. Since God 
knows the consequences of human actions, we can know that the weightiest decisions we 
make are understood and accounted for by God. Moreover, God knows the logistics of His 
own victory over evil since He has foreknown it eternally. Through His exhaustive 
knowledge of future events, God “can know how to order and rule our own lives and indeed 
all of history to ensure that his purposes of grace will be ultimately victorious.”12 The 
security and confidence of God’s people rests in His complete and infallible knowledge of 
the future. 
D. Philosophical Evidence for Arminianism 
1. The reality of future contingents. Additionally, a positive philosophical case 
can be made for divine foreknowledge. This case begins by defining God’s omniscience as 
His knowledge of all true propositions. Since this definition is readily accepted by every 
Christian position, the focus of the debate shifts to the truth value of future-tense 
                                                     
 12. Roy, How Much Does God Foreknow, 277. 
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statements. Peter Geach argued that “you can no more name an as yet non-existent object 
than you can christen a baby not yet conceived, or ring a bell not yet cast … such a name 
is not a name of an object until it has an object to name. And so existential quantification 
cannot be applied to objects that do not yet exist.”13 Others follow this same line of 
reasoning in an argument from truth against divine foreknowledge.14 
 However, why must truth only correspond to what presently exists? William Lane 
Craig argues that for future-tense statements to be true, the present-tense version of the 
same statement must also be true at some point in time. For instance, if someone said on 
March 1, 2016 that “Donald Trump will win the presidential election,” that statement is 
true because Donald Trump won the presidential election. It does not matter if the event 
exists at the time the statement is made; it still corresponds to the fact that Donald Trump 
won the presidential election. Second, the facts that constitute past-tense or present-tense 
statements also constitute future-tense statements. It seems rather arbitrary to deny the truth 
of a fact based on the tense in which it is stated. Third, this position results in a reductio ad 
absurdum: if truth only corresponds to presently-existing events, and past events no longer 
exist in the present, then to deny the truth of future-tense statements would also require the 
denial of past-tense statements, which severely limits human knowledge. Given these three 
arguments, it is reasonable to hold that future-tense statements or propositions can be true. 
Therefore, God’s omniscience must include exhaustive foreknowledge.15 
                                                     
 13. Peter Geach, Providence and Evil (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 54.  
 
 14. The argument from truth says that 1) Future events have not yet occurred. 2) A true statement 
corresponds to what has occurred. 3) Hence, no statements about the future can be true (since the future has 
not yet occurred). See Norman Geisler, The Battle for God: Responding to the Challenge of Neotheism 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Kregel, 2001), 59. 
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 Beyond this argument for divine foreknowledge, Arminians also provide several 
arguments for libertarian freedom, which is another key aspect of their position. There are 
many different versions of libertarian freedom, although every variation can fit into three 
broad categories: non-causalist or simple indeterminist, agent-causal, and event-causal or 
causal indeterminist.16 Arminians could fit into any of these three categories; yet this paper 
will focus on Robert Kane’s version of event-causal libertarian freedom, which has been 
one of the most prominent libertarian views of the past 30 years. 
2. Robert Kane’s event-causal libertarian freedom. For Kane, how one defines 
a person’s “will” is vitally important to understanding human freedom. At the basic level 
is a person’s appetitive will, which deals with the person’s desires and preferences; these 
act as the motivation for a person’s actions. For instance, a person’s desire to eat an apple 
is the reason why he or she buys an apple from the store. Second, there is the rational will, 
which controls one’s choices, decisions, and intentions; for example, a person exercises 
her rationality when she chooses to buy an apple rather than a pear. 17 Third, there is the 
                                                     
15. Craig develops these arguments in The Only Wise God: The Compatibility of Divine 
Foreknowledge and Human Freedom (Wipf & Stock Publishing, 2000), 56-61. 
 
16. “Agent-causal theories postulate ‘a sui generis form of [nonevent] causation’ by an agent or 
substance that is not reducible to causation by states or events of any kind involving the agent, physical or 
mental. Noncausalist or simple indeterminist theories insist that free choices or actions are uncaused events, 
which are nonetheless explicable in terms of an agent’s reasons or purposes. Causal indeterminist or event-
causal theories maintain that agents cause their ‘free actions via [their] reasons for doing so, but 
indeterministically.’” See Robert Kane, “Introduction: The Contours of Contemporary Free-Will Debates 
(Part 2)”, in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, 2nd edition, edited by Robert Kane (New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), 20. 
 
17. “Choices and decisions are to be understood as mental acts whose function is to settle 
uncertainty, terminate deliberation, and issue in intentions. Intentions are, in turn, states of mind that persist 
through time and guide action by way of providing plans for organizing both immediate and future action.” 
See Michael McKenna, “Compatibilist Ultimacy: Resisting the Threat of Kane’s U Condition*”, in 
Libertarian Free Will: Contemporary Debates, edited by David Palmer (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2014), 73. 
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striving will, which is the efforts one makes to carry out one’s intentions. For libertarian 
freedom to exist, Kane holds that there must be some indeterminacy between a person’s 
appetitive will and rational will: 
… it would be no threat to a libertarian conception of free will if the process giving 
rise to desires and preferences was a deterministic one. Nor would it threaten 
libertarian freedom if the relation between intentions once formed and overt actions 
was also deterministic. What would, however, undermine libertarian freedom is if 
the relation between an agent’s reasons once acquired and her subsequent choices 
and decisions was deterministic. Settling uncertainty about what to do, for Kane, 
given the reasons one has, is where the incompatibilists will locate distinctly 
libertarian freedom.18 
 
Additionally, Kane classifies three different kinds of free acts. First, there are Plain Free 
Acts (PFAs), which are actions done voluntarily, on purpose, and without coercion. Kane 
believes that these actions can occur in both deterministic and indeterministic situations, 
thereby accommodating to both compatibilist and libertarian conceptions of free will. 
Second, there are Freely Willed Acts (FWAs), which are done voluntarily, on purpose, and 
without coercion, but also are performed out of an intention which the person is ultimately 
responsible for. This means that a person could be motivated in a deterministic fashion, 
thereby being unable to act otherwise, and still be able to perform an FWA.19 
                                                     
18. Ibid., 74. I recognize that the word “indeterminacy” has a specific meaning in quantum physics, 
and this scientific use of the word has implications on the free will debate. However, Kane uses 
“indeterminacy” to refer to a lack of causal necessity, and I will be using the word in the same fashion 
throughout this essay. For those interested in the scientific side of the debate, I recommend reading Part II, 
“Physics, Determinism, and Indeterminism,” of The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, 2nd edition, edited by 
Robert Kane (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
  
19. “In the cases of many FWAs, probably most, all that is required is that the pertinent 
psychological ingredients in the proximal etiology of her acts be ones for which she is personally responsible. 
These ingredients have to be hers, in the sense that she helped form them. These motives, purposes, and 
character traits might themselves be secured within her overall psychic constitution so that she ‘just is’ the 
way she is at the time roughly coincident with the action. In this sense, she might, at that time, be unable to 
do otherwise, and so fail to satisfy an AP [alternate possibility] condition within the context of that time 
frame. Indeed, her performing of these FWAs thus might arise from locally deterministic causes that are 
internal to her own motivational psychology. But they will still count as FWAs so long as the proximal will-
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 The third kind of free act, Self-Forming Acts (SFAs), are most important in Kane’s 
analysis, since they are the only kind of act where indeterminacy must occur. SFAs are the 
actions that permanently define one’s character; they shape the course of one’s personal 
history. Now these kinds of actions are not so powerful as to drastically change lives 
because of one decision (though that may occur in extreme circumstances); lives are 
changed “by repeated activity, in piecemeal fashion, through a series of SFAs over the 
course of a life. Hence, the freedom of our agency, when we act of our own free wills is, 
at least sometimes, an achievement that represents the long-term shaping of our dearest 
conceptions of our own characters.”20 Thus, Kane holds that many decisions may arise 
deterministically and persons can still be held responsible; but for persons to be held 
responsible, one’s character must have been solidified over time through a succession of 
SFAs. 
 These SFAs enable a person to be ultimately responsible, where ultimate 
responsibility (UR) for an action requires that  
an agent must be responsible for anything that is a sufficient cause or motive for 
the action’s occurring. If, for example, a choice issues from, and can be sufficiently 
explained by, an agent’s character and motives (together with background 
conditions), then to be ultimately responsible for the choice, the agent must be at 
least in part responsible by virtue of choices or actions voluntarily performed in the 
past for having the character or motives he or she now has.21 
 
                                                     
constituting psychic ingredients themselves are the products of other FWAs wherein, at earlier times in her 
history, the agent acted in such a way as to then directly shape her character, her motives, and purposes by 
choosing or deciding in conditions of uncertainty involving torn decisions.” See McKenna, “Compatibilist 
Ultimacy,” 76. 
 
20. Ibid. 
  
21. Robert Kane, “Libertarianism”, in John Martin Fischer et al., Four Views on Free Will (Oxford, 
UK: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 14. 
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Yet for UR to be attributed to an agent, SFAs must also be will-setting actions, where 
“agents make choices or decisions between two or more competing options and do not 
settle on which of the options they want more, all things considered, until the moment of 
choice or decision itself.”22 Additionally, for there to be two or more competing options, 
Kane thinks that there must be more than one way a person could act voluntarily, 
intentionally, and rationally. He calls this the plurality conditions for free will.23 
 One can summarize Kane’s analysis into a three-step argument, which McKenna 
labels the Ultimacy Argument (UA): 
1. A person acts of her own free will only if she is the ultimate source of her act. 
2. If determinism is true, no one is the ultimate source of her acts. 
3. Therefore, if determinism is true, no one acts of her own free will.24 
 
Thus, Kane’s analysis (as summarized by McKenna) necessitates that any compatibilist 
account of free will must account for a person’s ultimate responsibility. If it cannot do so, 
then it seems that compatibilism cannot support moral responsibility.25 
E. Critiques of Arminianism 
 1. Biblical critiques. Biblically, one main point of contention between skeptics 
about divine foreknowledge and traditional Arminians is predictive prophecy. In the 
                                                     
22. Ibid., 20. 
 
 23. Ibid. 
 
24. Michael McKenna, “Compatibilist Ultimacy: Resisting the Threat of Kane’s U Condition*”, in 
Libertarian Free Will: Contemporary Debates, edited by David Palmer (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2014), 80. 
 
 25. Compatibilism, as a general view of human freedom, holds that “even if every act we perform 
is caused by something outside ourselves (such as natural causes or God), we are still free, for we can still 
act according to our character and desires.” See John Frame, The Doctrine of God (Phillipsburg, NJ: P & R 
Publishing, 2002), 136. In Kane’s terminology, compatibilism holds that even if a person is not the ultimate 
source of her act, she is still free since she acts according to her desires. 
FOREKNOWLEDGE 15 
section on Biblical Evidence for Arminianism, it was noted that predictive prophecy is a 
prominent feature of the Old Testament and is difficult for skeptics to properly explain. In 
response, they say that every predictive prophecy in scripture fits into one of three 
categories: prophecy can express God’s intention to do something in the future irrespective 
of creaturely decision; it can express God’s knowledge of what will happen due to 
necessary conditions currently existing in the world; or it may be a conditional prophecy 
about what will happen if something obtains.26 However, each of these options proves 
problematic for the skeptic. 
 If the skeptic’s analysis is correct, then the first option, God’s intention to do 
something irrespective of creaturely choices, must account for very few prophecies in 
scripture since they accept libertarian freedom. If libertarian freedom is extremely valuable 
to God, then it is unlikely that He would run roughshod over it to accomplish His purposes; 
and since many of the prophecies in scripture involve the free choices of human beings, 
these skeptics must hold that most prophecies fit into the other two categories. Yet the 
second option, God’s knowledge of what follows from necessary conditions, removes any 
theological significance from these predictions. Humans can know what necessarily 
follows from certain actions; consequently, these predictions would not be especially 
compelling or express God’s uniqueness. Subsequently, Arminians and Molinists accept 
the reality of conditional prophecies in scripture; they just view these prophecies as 
restating God’s moral standard rather than predicting the future. However, if skeptics are 
                                                     
 26. This schema was developed in Richard Rice, “Biblical Support for a New Perspective,” in The 
Openness of God: A Biblical Challenge to the Traditional Understanding of God (Downers Grove, IL: 
Intervarsity Press, 1994), 51-52, and has been widely accepted by others. 
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saying that God’s conditional prophecies are statements of His knowledge of what would 
occur given certain circumstances, then this is an assertion of God’s middle knowledge, 
which skeptics regularly deny. Thus, these three categories cannot account for every 
predictive prophecy in scripture, and the skeptic’s analysis fails.27 
 Even if the skeptics’s explanations did account for every predictive prophecy, they 
still fail to account for Isaiah 40-48 and John 13:19. Greg Boyd interprets Isaiah 46:9-11 
and 48:3 by appealing to God’s intention to bring about His own purposes: “The Lord is 
not appealing to information about the future he happens to possess; instead, he is appealing 
to his own intentions about the future. He foreknows that certain things are going to take 
place because he knows his own purpose and intention to bring these events about.”28 Yet 
this interpretation ignores the earlier chapters where God explicitly states that His criterion 
for true deity is knowledge of the future (e.g. Isaiah 41:22-28; 42:8-9). Additionally, none 
of the skeptics previously cited have explained John 13:19, where Jesus grounds His 
messianic purpose in His own ability to predict the future. Given the paltry explanation of 
these two passages by skeptics, one can only agree with Bruce Ware’s analysis: 
Since God himself declares the criterion by which the question of his deity is to be 
evaluated and established, and since that criterion is the possession of a knowledge 
of the future that can be declared and its truthfulness verified (or falsified) by the 
unfolding of future events, how utterly impertinent and presumptuous to deny of 
God divine foreknowledge and so deny the very basis by which God himself has 
declared that his claim to deity shall be vindicated and made known.29 
 
                                                     
 27. These arguments are made in Craig, The Only Wise God, 43-44; and Ware, God’s Lesser 
Glory, 132-134. 
  
28. Gregory Boyd, God of the Possible: A Biblical Introduction to the Open View of God (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 2000), 30. 
  
29. Bruce Ware, God’s Lesser Glory: The Diminished God of Open Theism (Wheaton, IL: 
Crossway Books, 2000), 104. 
FOREKNOWLEDGE 17 
 The other passages given in defense of exhaustive divine foreknowledge are poorly 
interpreted by skeptics as well. Boyd tries to argue that God predetermines some things 
without predetermining everything, even though Psalm 139:16 says that God ordained 
every day for David before he lived one of them. In response to texts declaring God’s plan 
for salvation to be through Christ before the foundation of the world (Eph. 1:3-14; 3:11; 1 
Cor. 2:7; 2 Tim. 1:9-10; Rev. 13:8; 17:8), Boyd and other skeptics argue that God 
predetermined that Jesus would die, but did not predetermine for specific people to kill 
Him.30 Yet if God decided before He created the world that Christ would be crucified, then 
He did so irrespective of creaturely decisions. Consequently, He had to plan for persons to 
crucify Jesus. Considering the number of people involved in Jesus’s betrayal and 
crucifixion, it seems unlikely that God could orchestrate Jesus’s crucifixion based on his 
knowledge of the past, present, and probability calculations concerning the future. Thus, it 
seems much more plausible that God has exhaustive foreknowledge.  
 2. The compatibility of divine foreknowledge and human action. Although the 
biblical evidence seems to conclusively favor divine foreknowledge, Arminians face 
tougher challenges by simultaneously holding to exhaustive divine foreknowledge and 
libertarian freedom. The problem may be shown through the following argument for 
theological fatalism: 
1. God’s being omniscient necessarily implies that if Jones mows his lawn on 
Saturday afternoon, then God believed at an earlier time that Jones would mow his 
lawn on Saturday afternoon. 
2. Necessarily, all of God’s beliefs are true. 
3. No one has the power to make a contradiction true. 
                                                     
30. Boyd argues that the Bible “never suggests that the individuals who participated in this event 
were predestined to do so or foreknown as doing so. It was certain that Jesus would be crucified, but it was 
not certain from eternity that Pilate, Herod, or Caiaphas would play the roles they played in the crucifixion. 
They participated in Christ’s death of their own free wills.” See God of the Possible, 45. 
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4. No one has the power to erase someone’s past beliefs, that is, to bring it about that 
something believed in the past by someone was not believed in the past by that 
person. 
5. No one has the power to erase someone’s existence in the past, that is, to bring it 
about that someone who existed in the past did not exist in the past. 
6. So if God believed that Jones would mow his lawn on Saturday afternoon, Jones 
can refrain from mowing his lawn only if one of the following alternatives is true: 
a. Jones has the power to make God’s belief false; 
b. Jones has the power to erase God’s past belief; or 
c. Jones has the power to erase God’s past existence. 
7. But alternative (a) is impossible (this follows from steps 2 and 3). 
8. And alternative (b) is impossible (this follows from step 4). 
9. And alternative (c) is impossible (this follows from step 5). 
10. Therefore, if God believes that Jones will mow his lawn on Saturday afternoon, 
Jones does not have the power to refrain from mowing his lawn on Saturday 
afternoon; that is to say, Jones is not free.31 
 
This argument is essentially a more nuanced version of the argument against exhaustive 
divine foreknowledge; subsequently, traditional Arminians must show how divine 
foreknowledge and libertarian freedom can coexist without infringing on each other. 
 The first attempt to reconcile foreknowledge and libertarian freedom is the 
Boethian view. Named after Saint Boethius, this view argues that since God exists outside 
of time, He knows all things at once, and there is no sequential time in His thought. In other 
words, “He simply knows in one eternal Now.”32 Because God exists outside of time, His 
knowledge is not temporally prior to Jones’s action, which means that the argument cannot 
get off the ground. Just like my watching Jones mow his lawn from across the street does 
not affect his freedom to continue or stop mowing, God’s eternal knowledge of Jones’s 
                                                     
 31. In The Only Wise God, William Lane Craig takes a whole chapter (“The Argument for 
Theological Fatalism”) to present this syllogism. However, Craig cites Nelson Pike as the original formulator 
of the argument. For Pike’s version, see his article “Divine Omniscience and Voluntary Action,” The 
Philosophical Review 74, no. 1 (Jan. 1965): 27-46, accessed January 21, 2017, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2183529. 
  
32. Geisler, The Battle for God, 62.  
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lawn mowing does not coerce or force Jones to perform that action. Therefore, the Boethian 
concludes that God can foreknow human actions without eliminating human freedom. 
 Since its initial statement in Boethius’s The Consolation of Philosophy, the 
Boethian view has been popular among laypersons as a go-to response to the sovereignty-
freedom debate, but it has received harsh criticism in the academic community. The 
simplest critique is to recognize that even if God’s timeless knowledge does not coerce a 
person into performing an action, “the timeless realm is as ontologically determinate and 
fixed as the past … we have no more reason to think that we can do anything about God’s 
timeless knowledge than about God’s past knowledge. If there is no use crying over spilt 
milk, there is no use crying over timelessly spilling milk either.”33 Even though it’s true 
that God’s timeless knowledge does not coerce a person into acting a certain way, it does 
not rebut the argument for theological fatalism. In order to circumvent the force of the 
argument, one must add something to God’s timeless knowledge to maintain the 
conjunction of foreknowledge and human freedom.34 
 Due to the failure of the Boethian view, many philosophers have tried to rebut the 
argument for theological fatalism by adopting two different variants of Ockhamism. Both 
versions rely on the distinction between soft and hard facts. Soft facts are facts whose 
grammar indicates the past but whose content belongs at least partly in the future; hard 
                                                     
33. Linda Zagzebski, “Recent Work on Divine Foreknowledge and Free Will,” in The Oxford 
Handbook of Free Will, 1st edition, edited by Robert Kane (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2002), 
52. 
 
 34. Molina also gives a more complex critique in Disputation 48, sections 9-11 (102-103 of 
Freddoso’s translation) and Disputation 49, sections 15-16 (122-124 of Freddoso’s translation). The reader 
can decide if Molina’s objection is cogent or not. 
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facts are facts whose grammar and content is entirely focused on the past.35 In the first 
version of Ockhamism, it is argued that God’s beliefs about the future are soft facts, and 
that this maintains libertarian freedom. For instance, Ockhamists will argue that God 
believes that Adam will sin is a soft fact by  
unpacking what it is for God to hold a belief about the future and then showing that 
this fact is constituted not just by what is now the case but also (in part) by what 
will be the case later … if God’s belief is constituted as the belief that Adam will 
sin only retroactively, once Adam actually sins, then nothing about God’s prior 
belief would appear to be inconsistent with either Adam’s freedom to sin or his 
freedom not to sin.36 
 
To understand how this argument works, it will be necessary to give further nuance to the 
argument against the conjunction of divine foreknowledge and human freedom. 
 The tension between divine foreknowledge and human freedom centers around the 
idea of accidental necessity, also known as temporal necessity.37 It works as follows: God 
is omniscient, so He knows all true propositions, including propositions about the future. 
This means that, as an example, God knows whether a person will have a glass of water 
rather than a glass of milk at lunchtime before he makes that choice. Yet God’s 
foreknowledge is also infallible, meaning that His knowledge of the future cannot be 
wrong. Consequently, if God knows that a person will choose to have a glass of water 
before he chooses to do so, and His knowledge is infallible, then he cannot choose other 
than what God already knows he will choose. Otherwise, if he chose to have the glass of 
                                                     
 35. Hunt, “The Simple-Foreknowledge View,” 84. 
  
36. Ibid. 
 
37. Both terms are used interchangeably, so I will use “temporal necessity” because it gives the 
reader a clearer understanding of the idea being conveyed. 
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milk, then God’s foreknowledge would be wrong and He would not be omniscient. Thus, 
his choosing the glass of water is now temporally necessary. 
 To maintain the coexistence of libertarian freedom and divine foreknowledge, 
Ockhamists argue that soft and hard facts are two kinds of facts that cannot overlap; a 
proposition can only be a soft fact or only be a hard fact. Additionally, they introduce three 
different principles: the Fixity of the Past Principle, which states that no one can do 
anything during a present or future time period to render false a truth strictly about a past 
time period; the Mixed Conjunction Principle, which states that the conjunction of one 
proposition strictly about a time period and another not strictly about that time period is 
also not strictly about that time period; and the Equivalence Principle, which states that if 
two propositions are equivalent, then one of them is strictly about a given time period just 
in case the other is also strictly about that time period. Given these three principles, the 
Ockhamist may argue that 
Since "God believed during t [a point in time] that X would do A during T [a later 
point in time]" and "God existed during t and X will do A during T" are equivalent, 
the equivalence principle forces a choice between both being strictly about t on the 
one hand and neither being strictly about t on the other. The mixed conjunction 
principle guarantees that "God existed during t and X will do A during T" is not 
strictly about t. So, "God believed during t that X would do A during T" must also 
fail to be strictly about t. 
 
Because the Fixity of the Past Principle only applies to truths strictly about a past time 
period, and “God believed during t that X would do A during T” is not strictly about the 
past, then God’s belief about the future could be falsified by human actions, meaning that 
God’s belief is not temporally necessary and libertarian freedom is maintained. This kind 
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of response has been heavily critiqued in the scholarly literature, but there are other views 
which seem more promising.38 
 Although the Boethian and Ockhamist views seem inadequate to rebut the argument 
for theological fatalism, Luis de Molina proposed a unique response to it that adds a fourth 
alternative to premise 6 (see page 18): d) if Jones were to act in a different way than what 
God foreknows, then God would have believed that instead of what he believes now. 
Molina says that “even if (i) the conditional is necessary (because … these two things 
cannot both obtain, namely, that God foreknows something to be future and that the thing 
does not turn out that way), and even if (ii) the antecedent is [temporally necessary], 
nonetheless the consequent can be purely contingent.”39 In essence, Molina argues that the 
foreknown event is the ground of God’s foreknowledge; if the ground of His 
foreknowledge were different than it is now, then God’s foreknowledge would be different 
than it is now: 
Pike is certainly correct that God’s infallibility prevents his holding a false belief. 
But that same infallibility guarantees that if Jones were to refrain, God would have 
held a different belief. Since God cannot be mistaken or fooled, he would have 
foreknown from eternity if Jones were going to refrain. God cannot hold a false 
belief. Therefore, whatever Jones will do, God foreknows it. If Jones were to act 
differently, God’s true belief would not have been false; rather his belief would 
have been different.40 
                                                     
38. The three definitions and the quote were from D.E. Brant, “On Plantinga’s Way Out,” Faith and 
Philosophy 14, no. 3 (July 1997): 338-340, accessed June 27, 2016, DOI:10.5840/faithphil199714327. In the 
original article, Brant used t’ to symbolizes “a later point in time”, but I substituted that with T to make the 
difference clearer, since the quotation marks made it hard to see the apostrophe. Also, I cannot discuss the 
objections to Ockhamism due to page constraints. However, I recommend that the reader start by reading 
Brant’s article, which gives a thorough critique of Alvin Plantinga’s version of Ockhamism. 
  
39. See Disputation 52, section 34 of On Divine Foreknowledge (page 189 of Freddoso’s 
translation). 
 
40. Craig, The Only Wise God, 71. Craig puts it another way on page 74: “God’s foreknowledge is 
chronologically prior to Jones’s mowing the lawn, but Jones’s mowing the lawn is logically prior to God’s 
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Because the event itself grounds God’s foreknowledge, the event itself cannot be 
temporally necessary; thus, human action is still free. 
 Just like the Boethian and Ockhamist views, the Molinist rebuttal does not escape 
criticism. David Hunt argues that this strategy does not avoid accidental necessity:  
Does it make any difference that God’s belief depends on what I do and that it 
would have been different if I were to act differently? No, for he has already held 
this belief, and my action must be consistent with this fact about the past … God’s 
believing that I will press the button does not leave me any alternatives to pressing 
the button, since he can’t hold that belief and I fail to press the button.41 
 
However, it seems that Hunt’s criticism misses the point of Molina’s argument. What 
follows from the argument for theological fatalism is that the action will happen, not that 
the event will necessarily happen: “From God’s foreknowledge of x we can be absolutely 
sure that x will happen. But it does not have to occur; it is possible for it to fail to happen. 
What is impossible is a situation in which God foreknows x and x fails to happen, for this 
would be a logical contradiction.”42 Therefore, it seems that Molina’s rebuttal to the 
argument for theological fatalism is coherent. 
 Nevertheless, if one does not find Molina’s rebuttal convincing, there is one more 
strategy available to Arminians. Hunt labels it the Augustinian view, as he argues that 
Augustine has been misinterpreted by those who espouse compatibilism regarding 
determinism and human freedom. The traditional interpretation of Augustine held that 
Augustine was a soft determinist who accepted that human actions are causally necessary. 
                                                     
foreknowledge. Jones’s mowing is the ground; God’s foreknowledge is its logical consequent; Jones’s 
mowing is the reason why God foreknows that Jones will mow the lawn.” 
 
41. Hunt, “The Simple-Foreknowledge View,” 86. 
  
42. Craig, The Only Wise God, 73. 
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By contrast, Hunt argues that Augustine rejected both causal necessity and the power of 
contrary choice:  
Temporal necessity is determined by the temporal order; but what is relevant to free 
agency, Augustine maintains, is the causal/explanatory order. The two orders 
normally coincide: what is prior in the one order is prior in the other. In cases of 
divine foreknowledge, however, the two orders diverge, and what is temporally 
closed (because infallibly foreknown) may remain causally/explanatorily open; as 
Augustine notes in The City of God, "a man does not therefore sin because God 
foreknew that he would sin" (V.lO). This is enough for Augustine to regard W as 
free despite the fact that God's foreknowledge of W renders it unavoidably 
necessary.43 
 
The result is a new form of libertarian freedom: even if a person does not have the power 
of contrary choice, she can freely choose as long as there are no causal constraints on her 
freedom. 
 Some Arminians may have a problem with rejecting the power of contrary choice, 
otherwise known as the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP), because it has been at the 
core of the Arminian position for many years. Boyd echoes this sentiment when he says 
that “Person X is free regarding an action A if and only if it’s genuinely possible for him 
to do ~A.”44 Yet for Hunt and others, PAP seems intuitively false. Henry Frankfurt 
developed supposed counterexamples to PAP which denied the power to do otherwise and 
yet seemingly maintained morally responsibility. Counterexamples to PAP usually involve 
a situation where a mechanism is placed inside a person’s head without her knowledge, 
and if she were to form the intention of performing a specific action, that mechanism would 
                                                     
43. David P. Hunt, “On Augustine’s Way Out,” Faith and Philosophy 16, no.1 (January 1999): 10, 
accessed June 2, 2016, DOI: 10.5840/faithphil19991612 
  
44. Gregory Boyd, “An Open-Theist Response,” in Divine Foreknowledge: Four Views, edited by 
J.K. Beilby and P.R. Eddy (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2001), 108. 
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activate and prevent her from performing the action. In the counterexample, the person 
chooses a different action, and the mechanism does not activate. Consequently, it is argued 
that even though she could not have done otherwise (the mechanism would have activated 
and prevented her from doing so), she is still responsible for the choice she makes since 
she was causally uninhibited. 
 For traditional libertarians, the invocation of a mechanism in someone’s head seems 
implausible and uncompelling. Consequently, there has been considerable debate over 
Frankfurtian counterexamples to PAP.45 In his contribution to the overall discussion, Hunt 
has argued that divine foreknowledge provides a better counterexample to PAP than 
Frankfurt’s argument: 
To whatever extent it is clear in the Frankfurt counterexamples that an action can 
be unavoidable without this jeopardizing its libertarian freedom, it is at least as clear 
(if not more so) in divine foreknowledge cases that the foreknown action can be 
unavoidable yet libertarianly free. The same intuitions that support Frankfurt's 
argument, when brought to bear on divine foreknowledge of human actions, 
provide direct support for the claim that these actions can be libertarianly free 
despite their inevitability. There is no need to seek indirect support for this 
judgment via a consideration of Frankfurt counterexamples—indeed, doing so can 
only muddy the waters by making freedom in the face of divine foreknowledge 
appear on a par with, and to require support from, freedom in the face of 
counterfactual intervention.46 
 
However, the discussion of Frankfurtian counterexamples and PAP, as well as the 
discussion of the tension between divine foreknowledge and human freedom, is only 
                                                     
45. For a nice representation of the overall discussion, see J.M. Fischer, “Responsibility and 
Control,” The Journal of Philosophy 79, no. 1 (January 1982): 24-40; David Widerker, “Libertarian Freedom 
and the Avoidability of Decisions,” Faith and Philosophy 12, no. 1 (January 1995): 113-118; and J.M. 
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46. David Hunt, “Frankfurt Counterexamples: Some Comments on the Widerker-Fischer Debate,” 
Faith and Philosophy 13, no. 3 (July 1996): 400, accessed May 29, 2016, DOI: 10.5840/faithphil199613331. 
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necessary if libertarian freedom itself is intelligible. Consequently, it is necessary to 
consider critiques to libertarian freedom to see if this core tenet of Arminianism is even 
required for moral responsibility. 
 3. Critiques of libertarian freedom. To begin, there are objections raised 
specifically against Robert Kane’s event-causal view of libertarian freedom. First, Michael 
McKenna argues that Kane’s UR condition is not necessary for moral responsibility by 
emphasizing the contextual nature of ultimacy:  
We speak, for instance, of the original or ultimate source of Perrier drinking water 
as being a spring somewhere in the south of France, and we regard the refrigerator 
or the bottling plant as, by contrast with the spring, a mediated source for the 
sparkling water in our glass. In ordinary contexts, it would never dawn on us to 
think that whether the water in our glass really originated in France turned on 
whether determinism was true or not.47 
 
Since the notion of ultimacy is context-sensitive, McKenna emphasizes the need to 
determine the context of ultimacy in discussions of moral responsibility. In his view, “the 
proper context for settling whether a person ultimately formed herself, or pertinent features 
of her character or will, via an SFA, is located in the domain of ordinary folk psychological 
discourse.”48 Even if libertarians disagree with contextualizing ultimacy in the domain of 
folk psychological discourse, McKenna thinks that it’s important to realize that there are 
many contexts in which ultimacy does not depend on whether determinism is true or false.49 
 In response, Kane partially agrees with McKenna’s analysis. He accepts that the 
notion of ultimacy is contextual, and that the source of Perrier drinking water does not 
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depend on whether determinism is true. However, he insists that in the context of free will 
and moral responsibility, it really does matter whether the person is responsible for their 
own character in some fashion or whether it is entirely due to deterministic factors: 
… if determinism is true, wherever you stop, there would always be conditions in 
the past such that once they had occurred (given the laws), it was settled that a 
person’s later will (character, motives, and purposes) would be exactly as it is now, 
though nothing whatever the person voluntarily and intentionally did or omitted 
played any role in producing or bringing about those conditions.50 
 
Although McKenna made some valuable points about contextualizing ultimacy, his point 
fails to challenge and/or defeat Kane’s understanding of ultimate responsibility. 
 Another objection to Kane’s view is the issue of competing desires and intentions. 
In Freedom of the Will, Jonathan Edwards harshly critiqued the idea that a person is in a 
state of complete indifference whenever she decides to perform an action, and that her 
desires and intentions do not decisively lean in one way or the other. He insisted that “to 
suppose the Will to act at all in a state of perfect indifference, is to assert that the mind 
chooses without choosing. To say that when it is indifferent, it can do as it pleases, is to 
say that it can follow its pleasure, when it has no pleasure to follow.”51 Edwards thought 
that the confusion resulted from the focus of the indifference. He held that the Arminian is 
thinking of indifference towards the objects he is choosing (each cake looks equally 
appetizing), whereas Edwards was speaking of indifference in the choice itself. 
Subsequently, he said that “the determination is not about the objects, unless indirectly and 
                                                     
 50. Robert Kane, “New Arguments in Debates on Libertarian Free Will: Responses to 
Contributors,” in Libertarian Free Will: Contemporary Debates, edited by David Palmer (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2014), 183. 
 
51. Jonathan Edwards, Freedom of the Will, 1754, reprint (Grand Rapids, MI: Christian Classics 
Ethereal Library, 1999), 48.  
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improperly, but about the actions, which it chooses for other reasons than any preference 
of the objects, and for reasons not taken at all from the objects.”52 In other words, one may 
be indifferent about the cake he chooses, but he is not indifferent about the choice to act 
itself. 
 In response, Kane would likely agree with Edwards, in that persons do not choose 
out of a state of indifference. In all situations, a person is inclined to perform an action. In 
this sense, both Edwards and Kane disagree with noncausal libertarians, who were 
Edwards’s primary intellectual opponent. However, the uniqueness of Kane’s view is that 
it focuses on the importance of circumstances where persons have the desire to complete 
two different efforts: 
These [are] circumstances in which (i) we are deliberating between competing 
options; (ii) we intend to choose one or the other but cannot choose both; (iii) we 
have powerful motives for wanting to choose each of the options for different and 
competing reasons; (iv) there is a consequent resistance in our will to either choice, 
so that (v) if either choice is to have a chance of being made, effort will have to be 
made to overcome the temptation to make the other choice; and (vi) we want to 
give each choice a fighting chance of being made because the motives for each 
choice are important to us. The motives for each choice define in part what sort of 
person we are; and we would be taking them lightly if we did not make an effort in 
their behalf. These conditions, I contend, are the conditions of ‘self-forming’ 
actions (SFAs).53 
 
Kane readily accepts that persons always have intentions for performing actions, but he 
insists that there must not be any external or internal causal coercion involved in SFAs. 
 A third and final objection to Kane’s event-causal view of libertarian freedom takes 
the form of an infinite regress argument: if SFAs are required for free and morally 
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responsible actions, then must these be preceded by other SFAs? If so, then it seems like 
those SFAs would need to be preceded by other SFAs, and on goes the infinite regress. 
Subsequently, Kane recognizes this infinite regress and argues that SFAs need not be 
preceded by more SFAs. Instead, an agent must simply have teleological guidance control 
(TGC). This kind of control is exhibited in persons when they tend “through feedback loops 
and error correction to converge on a goal in the face of perturbations … the kind of control 
(TGC) agents exercise over the efforts or volitional streams that may lead to SFAs—in 
contrast to the [plural voluntary control] they exercise over the SFAs themselves—is a 
compatibilist kind of control.”54 However, TGC is also compatible with indeterminism, 
meaning that persons are responsible irrespective of the necessity involved in the action. 
Kane recognizes that the resulting view is quite remarkable when he calls the reader to 
Note where we thus arrive: multiple parallel goal-directed cognitive processes 
(volitional streams, as I also call them) simultaneously exercised by the agent, over 
each of which the agent has ‘one-way’ or singular voluntary control (TGC), when 
occurring together, make possible ‘more-than-one-way’ or plural voluntary control 
(PVC), since the agent might succeed in attaining the goal of either process at a 
given time voluntarily, on purpose and for reasons. Stated differently, two cognitive 
processes over each of which an agent has what Fischer calls guidance control, 
exercised simultaneously and in parallel, give rise to what he calls regulative 
control, the power at a time to bring about a choice by attempting to bring it about 
and the power at that same time to bring about an alternative choice by attempting 
to bring it about.55 
 
 Beyond the critiques of Kane’s specific view, there are several critiques of 
libertarian freedom in general that arise from both philosophical and theological issues. 
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The most prominent critique of libertarian freedom is the luck/chance objection, which 
argues that indeterminism makes all human actions arbitrary or the result of luck or chance. 
Before answering this objection, Kane starts by explaining five key aspects of his position. 
First, he holds that indeterminism need not be involved in every act a person makes of her 
own free will; indeterminism is only necessary for SFAs. Second, he holds that SFAs occur 
when one encounters two difficult choices that she must choose between, which involves 
some internal tension that Kane attributes to indeterminacy in a person’s neural processes.56 
 Third, Kane labels this indeterminism in the neural processes parallel processing. 
To explain this idea, Kane posits a woman who encounters a mugging on her way to work. 
She has two competing motivations: help the victim, or continue her commute and avoid 
getting involved. Given the complexity of the idea, it will be useful to quote Kane here at 
length: 
… imagine that two competing neural networks are involved, each influencing the 
other and representing her conflicting motivations. (These are complex networks 
of interconnected neurons in the brain circulating impulses in feedback loops that 
are generally involved in higher-level cognitive processing). The input of one of 
these networks consists in the woman’s desires and motives for stopping to help 
the victim. If the network reaches a certain activation threshold (the simultaneous 
firing of a complex set of ‘output’ neurons), that would represent her choice to help. 
For the competing network, the inputs are her ambitious motives for going on to 
her meeting; and its reaching an activation threshold represents the choice to go on. 
Now imagine further that the two networks are connected so that the indeterminism 
that is an obstacle to her making one of the choices is present because of her 
simultaneous conflicting desire to make the other choice—the indeterminism thus 
arising from a tension-creating conflict in the will, as noted. Under such 
circumstances, when either of the pathways reaches an activation threshold which 
amounts to choice, it would be like your solving the mathematical problem by 
overcoming the indeterministic background noise generated by the presence of the 
other pathway. And just as when you solved the mathematical problem despite the 
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presence of this indeterminism, one could say you did it and are responsible for it, 
so one can say this as well, I would argue, in the present case, whichever one is 
chosen. The network through which she succeeds in reaching a choice threshold 
will have succeeded despite the indeterminism present because of the existence of 
the competing networks.57 
 
Fourth, he holds that the indeterminism involved in the choice is an ingredient in 
the larger teleological activities of the agent, where the indeterminism functions as an 
interference of the cognitive processes which could result in either the failure or success of 
the goal. Fifth, he holds that this indeterminism, when functioning as an obstacle to the 
teleological activity of the agent, does not exclude responsibility if the activity reaches its 
intended goal. Assuming these five steps, Kane argues that the luck objection does not 
apply to his version of libertarian freedom.58 
The first version of the luck objection argues that the agent did not bring about the 
action, but rather that it “just happened.” Kane responds by stating that “the agent brings 
about the choice that is made by engaging in a goal-directed process of trying or attempting 
or making an effort to bring about that particular choice for the reasons favoring it, and by 
succeeding in attaining this goal, whichever choice is made.”59 The second version argues 
that the agent did not have control over the choice, but Kane says that the agent has the 
power to make the event be or not be, as well as the power to make the competing choice 
be, because “either of the efforts in which the agent is engaged might succeed in attaining 
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its goal despite the chance of failure,” with the chance of failure coming from the 
indeterminacy in the cognitive processes. 
The third, fourth, and fifth versions of the objection stipulate that the choice was 
not made intentionally/voluntarily/for reasons, but Kane responds by pointing out that the 
choice would have resulted from a goal-oriented cognitive process aimed at making that 
choice; and since the alternative was also available to the agent, it would have been made 
voluntarily and for reasons given by the agent. Finally, the sixth version of the objection 
questions the agent’s moral responsibility for the action. Yet Kane holds that agents in 
SFAs have plural voluntary control, which is “the power to act in more than one way and 
to be able to do so, either way, voluntarily, intentionally, and rationally,” and this seems 
satisfactory for the agent to be considered morally responsible for that choice.60 Therefore, 
since all six versions of the luck objection have been sufficiently accounted for by Kane’s 
analysis, it seems that the luck objection fails to challenge libertarian freedom. 
The underlying factor behind these different versions of the luck objection is the 
idea that “if the occurrence of a choice depends on the occurrence of some undetermined 
or chance events (e.g., quantum events) in the brain over which the agent lacks control, 
then whether or not the choice occurs would appear to be the matter of luck or chance,” 
which removes responsibility.61 In other words, the objector thinks that one needs to micro-
manage each neuron in order to be responsible for the action. However, this would be a 
misunderstanding of cognitive processes. To perform purposive actions, what one needs is  
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macro-control of processes involving many neurons—processes that may succeed 
in achieving their goals despite the interfering or hindering effects of some 
recalcitrant neurons. We do not micro-manage our actions by controlling each 
individual neuron or muscle that might be involved. But that does not prevent us 
from macro-managing our purposive activities (whether they be mental activities 
such as practical reasoning, or physical activities, such as arm-swingings) and being 
responsible when those purposive activities attain their goals.62 
 
Thus, instead of the indeterminacy being the cause of the action, the reasons/motives of the 
person and his efforts to overcome the temptation to perform the other choice are the cause, 
and the indeterminacy acts as a causally relevant hindrance or interference for the 
achievement of the outcome.63 
In addition to the luck objection, Jonathan Edwards critiqued non-causal 
libertarians on their understanding of causation. In his time, Arminians argued that any 
form of necessity eliminated human freedom. Edwards retaliated by arguing that this 
conception of causation could never work. First, saying that an event has a cause of its 
existence and yet is not connected to that cause is inconsistent, for it directly denies the 
definition of contingency. An effect that is contingent to its cause is necessarily dependent 
upon its cause for its existence; to say otherwise is unintelligible. Second, if the effect was 
not necessarily connected to the cause, then it would have no cause or reason for its 
existence, which is directly opposing the reasoning previously considered. Third, to 
suppose that events may have causes which they are not directly connected to is to say that 
                                                     
62. Ibid., 395. 
 
 63. As an example of a causally relevant hindrance or interference, Kane uses the example of a 
vaccine: “A vaccination may hinder or lower the probability that I will get a certain disease, so it is causally 
relevant to the outcome. But if I get the disease despite it, the vaccination is not the cause of my getting the 
disease, though it was causally relevant, because its role was to hinder that effect. The causes of my getting 
the disease, by contrast, are those causally relevant factors (e.g., the infecting virus) that significantly 
enhanced the probability of its occurrence.” See ibid., 394. 
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an effect’s cause is not its cause, which is an explicit contradiction. Thus, Edwards found 
it “clearly manifest, that every effect has a necessary connection with its cause, or with that 
which is the true ground and reason of its existence.”64 
Kane would agree with Edwards’s analysis, since he finds non-causal 
libertarianism to be unintelligible as well. Subsequently, he would likely argue that his own 
event-causal view is not susceptible to such critique, and he could argue so for two reasons. 
First, Kane accepts that most actions are examples of teleological guidance control, and 
since this is compatible with determinism, he would not disagree with Edwards. Second, 
Kane could argue that self-forming actions are connected to their cause, but that cause is 
hindered due to the competing cognitive processes. In other words, Kane could recognize 
the necessary connection between cause and effect without giving up indeterminism. 
Although the philosophical objections to Kane’s event-causal libertarian freedom 
seem ineffective, John Frame provides theological objections to libertarian freedom in 
general. One group of criticisms points out that the Bible never explicitly teaches, grounds 
moral responsibility in, places any positive value on, or judges anyone’s conduct by 
reference to libertarian freedom. In this case, Frame is absolutely right; libertarian freedom 
is a philosophical concept that is never explicitly proposed in scripture. Likewise, one could 
argue that compatibilist freedom is not explicitly proposed either. Frame argues that the 
“integrity of human personality is not possible in a libertarian construction, for on that view 
the will must always be independent of the heart and all of our other faculties,” but it seems 
                                                     
 64. These arguments come from Edwards, Freedom of the Will, 59-61. The quote specifically comes 
from page 61. 
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that this critique does not hold for Kane’s event-causal view, since the heart and all other 
faculties are necessary for the cognitive processes we undergo when making a decision.65 
Additionally, Frame argues that since people won’t sin in heaven, and since God 
cannot act against His own holy character, then libertarian freedom must be false.66 Yet 
Kane’s view does not rest upon the power of contrary choice; instead, it maintains that a 
person must be ultimately responsible for the action, which requires that the action itself 
must be made intentionally and without coercion, or that the action deterministically 
follows from a prior SFA. In this sense of ultimate responsibility, God is a unique case; 
since His character is perfectly good and immutable, He has never required any “self-
forming” or “will-setting.” Consequently, God has never performed a SFA, but He could 
still perform FWAs (see page 12) and be ultimately responsible for those choices. 
Similarly, people in heaven will have formed their wills through a succession of SFAs 
throughout their lifetime. As Christians live on earth, their desires and motives will become 
more in tune with God’s perfectly good desires. Consequently, it is plausible that they 
would perform FWAs in heaven and, due to their will being permanently set to follow God, 
not sin. Thus, Frame’s objections fail to apply to Kane’s event-causal view. 
Frame’s final category of objections to libertarian freedom also questions the 
explanatory power of simple foreknowledge. These objections focus upon God’s 
providential control of the world: how does God ensure that His plan will come to pass if 
humans have libertarian freedom? Scripture attests to God’s control over all creation, 
                                                     
 65. John Frame, The Doctrine of God, 142. 
 
66. The argument from the lack of sin in heaven comes from page 140 of The Doctrine of God, 
while the argument from God’s character comes from page 142. 
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including the many sins committed by people throughout history. Arminius himself 
declared that God’s providence “preserves, regulates, governs and directs all things and 
that nothing in the world happens fortuitously or by chance.”67 Given this strong view of 
God’s control over creation, one must ask if simple foreknowledge is sufficient to “govern 
and direct all things.” 
 4. Simple foreknowledge and providential control. Skeptics concerning divine 
foreknowledge have argued that simple foreknowledge has the same amount of 
providential control as present knowledge; thus, simple foreknowledge is insufficient for 
the strong view of divine providence stated above. The argument starts by defining simple 
foreknowledge as complete and infallible knowledge of the future. What follows from this 
definition proves problematic: 
since foreknowledge can be utilized in a providentially beneficial manner only if 
there is a time at which what is foreknown can influence a divine decision that is 
itself not also already foreknown, there can exist no conceivable context in which 
[simple foreknowledge] would enable God to make providentially beneficial 
decisions that he would not be able to make without this knowledge.68 
 
In other words, foreknowledge would only be helpful if God has not made up His mind 
about how to act; but because God foreknows both the future events in the actual world 
and His own response to those events, foreknowledge does not give him any advantage. 
                                                     
67. Jacob Arminius, “A Declaration of the Sentiments of Arminius”, in The Works of Jacob 
Arminius, vol. 1, translated by James Nichols (Buffalo, NY: Derby, Orton, and Mulligan, 1853), accessed 
June 11, 2016, http://wesley.nnu.edu/arminianism/the-works-of-james-arminius/volume-1/arminius-
theological-sentiments/. 
  
68. David Basinger, The Case for Freewill Theism: A Philosophical Assessment (Downers Grove, 
IL: InterVarsity Press, 1996) 55. 
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This could also result in a violation of the Doxastic Principle, which states that “it is 
impossible to hold the belief that p while deciding to bring it about that p.”69 
 David Hunt seeks to avoid this problem by narrowing the scope of the Doxastic 
Principle. He does so by delineating between accessed and unaccessed knowledge. In 
human experience, accessed knowledge is what one consciously thinks of at a moment in 
time; unaccessed knowledge is what one holds in his subconscious and accesses when 
needed. Hunt thinks that God’s knowledge could work in the same way, in that God would 
“possess complete unaccessed foreknowledge and simply access whatever would 
maximize providential control without stultification.”70 Tomis Kapitan agrees with this 
analysis, arguing that the Doxastic Principle would only be plausible if revised to account 
for accessed and unaccessed knowledge: “It is impossible for a rational, self-reflective 
agent to consciously entertain the belief that he/she will perform an action A while, at the 
same time, deliberating about whether to perform A.”71  
Nevertheless, Kapitan also recognizes that another principle undergirds the 
Doxastic Principle, one that involves the notion of doxastic openness: “If at t1 S decides to 
do action A, then at some time t2 appropriately prior to t1, S believes that it is yet open for 
him/her to do A.”72 Doxastic openness implies that God forms intentions and deliberates 
between different options, but if God foreknows what He will do in the future, then this 
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(June 1993): 399, accessed May 29, 2016, DOI: 10.5840/faithphil19931036. 
  
70. Ibid., 409. 
 
71. Tomis Kapitan, “Providence, Foreknowledge, and Decisions Procedures,” Faith and Philosophy 
10, no. 3 (July 1993): 416, accessed May 29, 2016, DOI: 10.5840/faithphil19991612. 
 
72. Ibid., 415. 
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deliberation and intention-formation cannot occur, leaving God providentially impotent. 
Subsequently, Hunt suggests that there is a difference between propositional and practical 
beliefs which may avoid this doxastic problem: “what one comes to believe as a result of 
foreknowledge is a propositional belief about what will happen, whereas what one comes 
to believe as a result of deciding is a practical belief about what to do … even if the 
propositional belief is acquired first, it may still be necessary to go through the actual 
process of decision-making in order to achieve the practical belief.”73 
For this distinction between propositional and practical beliefs to work, Hunt posits 
that before God chose to create the world, He thought through possible sets of conditions 
He would encounter. As He thought through the possible situations, He decided that if 
some event X obtains, then it would be best to respond with action Y. Hunt thinks that God 
did this for every possible instance of providential control that He might perform, and that 
some of these instances might require God to act before the temporal occurrence of X. 
Once He has decided what to do for every possible instance of providential control, God 
accesses His simple foreknowledge and determines which of these possible sets of 
conditions will actually occur in creation. Because God knows which conditions will 
obtain, He subsequently acts to accomplish the plans He formulated before His 
foreknowledge was accessed. If this conception of God’s mental activity is correct, then 
“simple foreknowledge allows God to undertake providential interventions that would not 
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otherwise have been feasible, and only complete foreknowledge can guarantee that no 
conditional decision with a true antecedent will go unimplemented.”74 
Although Hunt argues that this model bypasses the doxastic problem at hand, he 
fails to see the fatal flaw in his argument. Even if God did this planning without accessing 
His foreknowledge, once He decides to access it, then He consciously knows that He will 
perform a certain action while also deliberating about whether to perform that action, which 
violates the revised Doxastic Principle. Thus, the doxastic problem remains. Yet David 
Basinger wonders if Hunt’s argument could be salvaged by replacing God’s complete and 
infallible foreknowledge with “a justified belief about what will quite probably come 
about.”75 If God only believed that something would probably happen, then He might still 
be doxastically open per Kapitan’s definition. 
David Basinger answers his own question by examining God’s desires. Since God 
is a perfectly good being, it seems that He would be committed to doing as much as He 
possibly could to accomplish His desired ends, since His own ends would also be perfectly 
good. If God is committed to achieving His own ends, then He must consider the relevant 
data to understand what is necessary to meet His own goals. Otherwise,  
it is not only possible that he will make decisions that fail to actualize his desired 
ends to the extent they could have been actualized if he had considered all of the 
relevant data available, it is possible that his decisions will in fact significantly 
hinder the actualization of his creative goals. Thus, if we assume that God is a 
perfectly good being, we must conclude, I believe, that he would never formulate 
conditional decisions before creation that did not contain in the antecedent 
                                                     
 74. The entire argument, which ends with this quote, is found in “Divine Providence and Simple 
Foreknowledge,” 413. Note: This sequence is an explication of the logical process in God’s mind; to interpret 
this as a temporal sequence would be a misinterpretation of Hunt’s position. 
 
75. Basinger, The Case for Freewill Theism, 126. 
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conditions all the relevant data to which he would have access when these decisions 
were implemented.76 
 
Once one agrees that God formulated these conditional decisions and consulted the relevant 
data in order to do so, then it follows that God must have knowledge of His own actions 
and the consequences of those actions as part of the relevant data being considered. This is 
eminently plausible, as God could commit Himself to an action and then discover that this 
decision would not accomplish His own ends. To ensure that His own perfectly good goals 
would be met, God must have complete knowledge of His own future actions and their 
consequences. Yet if He requires complete knowledge of His own actions and their 
consequences, then He cannot form conditional plans based on probability, which loops 
directly back into the Doxastic Problem. Thus, if simple foreknowledge is adopted, then 
God cannot act providentially in His own creation.77 
 The resulting image of God is defined by impotence, which clearly contrasts God’s 
depiction in scripture: “The mind of man plans his way, but the Lord directs his steps.”78 
To properly account for the biblical text, one’s view of divine foreknowledge must allow 
God to providential guide the world according to His perfectly good will. Moreover, one’s 
view of divine foreknowledge must support a coherent view of human freedom and moral 
responsibility. The next view under consideration—Molinism—attempts to balance both 
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77. This has been a paraphrase of Basinger’s argument. If one wishes to read the entire 
formulation in Basinger’s own words, consult his appendix, “Simple Foreknowledge and Providential 
Control,” in The Case for Freewill Theism. 
 
78. Proverbs 16:9 NASB. There are other passages that describe God’s providential control, but 
this verse seemed most straightforward. 
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aspects by positing divine middle knowledge. It remains to be seen whether Molinism 
adequately accounts for divine foreknowledge or whether it falls flat. 
II. Molinism 
A. The Molinist Definition of Divine Foreknowledge 
 To properly understand the Molinist definition of divine foreknowledge, one must 
first understand middle knowledge; and to understand middle knowledge, one needs to 
understand the several compartments of God’s knowledge. Consequently, it will be best to 
start by defining God’s natural knowledge, which is the first compartment. As has been 
discussed previously, Christians hold that God is, by nature, omniscient. Thus, natural 
knowledge refers to what God must know by nature of being omniscient. This category 
includes knowledge of all logically possible worlds as well as knowledge of all 
metaphysically necessary truths.79 This natural knowledge is also prevolitional, meaning 
that God had this knowledge prior to any creative act.80 
 Another compartment of God’s knowledge is free knowledge. When God decided 
to create a world, He did so out of His own divine will; He was not forced to create by 
anyone/anything else. By choosing to create a world, He foreknows what exists in the 
actual world. Since this knowledge results from His creative act, and God freely chose to 
create the world, it is labeled free or postvolitional knowledge. In other words, God could 
                                                     
79. Freddoso defines metaphysical necessity as a state of affairs obtaining “at every moment in 
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time arrangements of creatures so that He knows how they will interact with each other. From his 
“Introduction,” 11-12. 
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FOREKNOWLEDGE 42 
have decided to not create a world and thereby not have free knowledge while still having 
natural knowledge.81 
 In between God’s natural and free knowledge is His middle knowledge, which is 
unique to Molinism.82 Through his middle knowledge, God knows conditional future 
contingents, otherwise known as counterfactuals of freedom.83 This particular kind of 
proposition indicates what effects “would in fact be produced, remotely or immediately, by 
indeterministic secondary causes under a condition or hypothesis that specifies a possible 
spatio-temporal arrangement of secondary causes.”84 In other words, counterfactuals of 
freedom indicate what God could create in any possible world given the secondary causes 
included in each possible world. Additionally, middle knowledge shares characteristics of 
both natural and free knowledge. Middle knowledge is prevolitional like natural 
knowledge, meaning that God has no control over which counterfactuals of freedom are 
true and which are false; yet middle knowledge is also contingent like free knowledge, in 
                                                     
 81. Thomas Flint refers to four different logical moments, where “in the third logical moment, God 
decides upon a particular creative act of will—he decides which beings to create in which circumstances. 
From this divine decision and the knowledge which precedes it flow not only all contingent creaturely events 
ultimately precipitated by God’s creative action, but also (and immediately) the fourth logical moment, in 
which God knows all the contingent truths under his control—that is, in which he has free knowledge.” See 
his discussion in Divine Providence: The Molinist Account (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1998), 43. 
 
 82. Other positions, such as Calvinism, hold that God knows what persons would do when placed 
in certain circumstances. However, they would not separate this from God’s natural knowledge; Molinism is 
unique in its separation of natural and middle knowledge. 
 
 83. In his own writing, Freddoso refers to them as conditional future contingents because it makes 
sense within Molina’s own terminology. Later Molinist writings refer to them as counterfactuals of freedom, 
and William Lane Craig sometimes calls them subjunctive conditionals. 
 
 84. Freddoso, “Introduction,” 21. 
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the sense that counterfactuals of freedom that are true could have been false depending 
upon the possible world in question.85 
 By introducing the concept of divine middle knowledge, Molina provided a way to 
ground God’s complete and infallible foreknowledge in His own decree without sacrificing 
the libertarian freedom of free creatures. The logical process flows as follows: natural 
knowledge enables God to know infallibly how Peter could act in any logically possible 
world. Middle knowledge enables God to know infallibly how Peter would act given any 
possible combination of secondary causes and circumstances. God then decides to actualize 
one of these worlds, with the actual world containing the situation where Peter denied 
Christ three times. God’s free knowledge is His knowledge of the actualization of this 
situation. In other words, 
given that God knows infallibly by His middle knowledge that Peter would in fact 
freely deny Christ if placed in those circumstances, it follows that by decreeing that 
Peter will be in those circumstances God ensures that it is true from eternity that 
Peter will freely sin—long before Peter actually brings about the effect in question. 
So God freely knows that Peter will sin because it is already true by divine decree 
that Peter will sin, just as God freely knows that a given necessary effect will obtain 
because it is already true by divine decree that it will obtain. And it is in this sense—
and this sense alone—that God knows by His free knowledge that S will obtain 
because S will in fact obtain.86 
 
                                                     
 85. Ibid., 47. Freddoso makes the distinction between the three kinds of knowledge clearer by using 
Adam’s sin in the garden as an example on page 47: “By His natural knowledge God knows that it is 
metaphysically possible but not metaphysically necessary that Adam will sin if placed in the garden; by His 
free knowledge he knows that Adam will in fact be placed in the garden and will in fact sin. What He knows 
by His middle knowledge, on the other hand, is something stronger than the former but weaker than the latter, 
namely, that Adam will sin on the condition that he be placed in the garden. So God has middle knowledge 
… if and only if He has comprehensive prevolitional knowledge of conditional future contingents.” 
 
86. The paragraph is paraphrased and the quotation is taken from ibid., 54. Flint also importantly 
notes that “Free knowledge, then, is neither causally nor explanatorily prior to the true future contingent 
foreknown. Indeed, in the sense that the truth of a proposition must be thought of as prior to the fact that 
someone knows that truth, it seems evident that the true future contingent should be seen as explanatorily 
prior to God’s knowledge of it.” Cf. Divine Providence, 45. 
FOREKNOWLEDGE 44 
B. Biblical Evidence for Molinism 
 As far as biblical evidence for divine foreknowledge goes, Molinists and Arminians 
agree that the Bible clearly teaches God’s complete and infallible knowledge of the future. 
Rather, the issue is whether scripture teaches God’s knowledge of counterfactuals of 
freedom. Molina and other Molinists cite two passages that seem to suggest God’s middle 
knowledge: 1 Samuel 23:6-13 and Matthew 11:20-24. In 1 Samuel 23, David is told that 
Saul and his large army are marching toward Keilah to capture David and his men. When 
David hears this report, he asks God whether Saul will come to Keilah to capture him, and 
God says that Saul will march on the city. David then asks if the inhabitants of Keilah will 
turn him and his men over to Saul, and God says that they will. Consequently, David and 
his men leave before Saul arrives and they avoid getting captured. 
 Now this result raises some questions. Why did God answer affirmatively to both 
of David’s questions if David did not actually get captured? Rather than denying God’s 
foreknowledge, it makes more sense to posit that God knew the following counterfactual: 
“If David remains in Keilah until Saul arrives, the men of Keilah would turn David over to 
Saul.” This situation only makes sense if God knows counterfactuals of freedom. Likewise, 
Jesus displays knowledge of counterfactuals when He judges Chorazin and Bethsaida: 
“Woe to you Chorazin! Woe to you, Bethsaida! For if the miracles had occurred in Tyre 
and Sidon which occurred in you, they would have repented long ago in sackcloth and 
ashes.”87 Without knowledge of counterfactuals, Jesus could not honestly make this 
statement. 
                                                     
87. Matt. 11:21. Other passages that are less cited but also display God’s counterfactual knowledge: 
Jeremiah 38:17-18 and John 15:22-24. The passages cited in this section were referenced by William Lane 
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Additionally, Molinists hold to a strong account of divine providence. However, it 
would take too much space to fully explicate the biblical case for strong providential 
control, so the reader must examine the evidence at his or her leisure.88 
C. Theological Evidence for Molinism 
 Admittedly, the Molinist position cannot be directly proven from scripture, since 
the concept of middle knowledge requires counterfactuals to be known prevolitionally, and 
this is not mentioned by any passage of scripture. In other words, middle knowledge is a 
philosophically derived concept rather than something that is derived from scripture. 
Nevertheless, the Molinist position proves to be very compelling when one sees its 
implications for Christian doctrine. 
First, Molinism provides a coherent view of divine providence. Since God knows 
what any person would in fact do in any set of circumstances, He may order the world to 
meet His goals and purposes without compromising human freedom and the resultant 
moral responsibility. The world is such that God will certainly have the ultimate victory 
over evil because He chooses what circumstances to actualize, and this enables Him to 
ensure that He will be glorified and exalted by what occurs in creation.89 
                                                     
Craig in his chapter, “The Middle-Knowledge View,” in Divine Foreknowledge: Four Views, edited by J.K. 
Beilby and P.R. Eddy (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2001), 123-124. 
 
88. For a book-length discussion of the relevant biblical passages, see D.A. Carson, Divine 
Sovereignty and Human Responsibility: Biblical Perspectives in Tension (Atlanta, GA: John Knox Press, 
1994). For more coverage of the New Testament data, see chapter four, “God’s Control: Its Efficacy and 
Universality,” in Frame, The Doctrine of God. 
  
89. Craig even argues that God could providentially guide the world to have an optimal balance of 
saved and unsaved persons, where “those who never in fact hear the gospel are persons who would not 
respond to it if they did hear it. God brings the gospel to all those who he knows will respond to it if they 
hear it. Thus, the motivation for the missionary enterprise is to be God’s ambassadors in bringing the gospel 
to those whom God has arranged to freely receive it when they hear it. No one who would respond if he heard 
it will be lost.” Cf. The Only Wise God, 150-151. 
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 Second, Molinism provides a coherent picture of prophecy. The Molinist could 
provide a model of prophecy that involves God’s middle knowledge, thereby ensuring the 
certainty of the event while also ensuring the freedom of the person performing the 
prophesied action. Flint argues that  
we need to think of God as prevolitionally recognizing via middle knowledge that, 
if he willed to put Peter in C*, Peter would deny Jesus, and God could, if he so 
willed, prophesy that denial. On the basis of this (and other) prevolitional 
knowledge, God could then perform a single act of will that would have among its 
results both Peter’s being in C* and Jesus’s prophesying the denial; and only 
logically posterior to this single act of will would God have foreknowledge.90 
 
Therefore, God can have complete certainty about the actual occurrence of the action 
prophesied due to His providential guidance via middle knowledge while maintaining the 
freedom of the person being prophesied. 
 Beyond these two theological topics, there have been several essays arguing for 
Molinist understandings of the perseverance of the saints, biblical inspiration, infallibility, 
and theistic evolution.91 In sum, the Molinist doctrine of middle knowledge has some wide-
reaching explanatory power that Open Theism and Arminianism cannot match. 
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D. Philosophical Evidence for Molinism 
Much of the philosophical evidence for Molinism has been explained in the 
previous section on Philosophical Evidence for Arminianism. Thus, if one wants evidence 
for Molinism’s conjunction of divine foreknowledge and human freedom or for its support 
for libertarian freedom, turn back to that section. This section will give an argument for 
middle knowledge that was presented by William Lane Craig and explain its premises. The 
argument runs as follows: 
1. If there are true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, then God knows these truths. 
2. There are true counterfactuals of freedom. 
3. If God knows true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, God knows them either 
logically prior to the divine creative decree or only logically posterior to the divine 
creative decree. 
4. Counterfactuals of creaturely freedom cannot be known only logically posterior to 
the divine creative decree. 
5. Therefore, God knows true counterfactuals of freedom (from 1 and 2). 
6. Therefore, God knows true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom either logically 
prior to the divine creative decree or only logically posterior to the divine creative 
decree (from 3 and 5). 
7. God knows true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom logically prior to the divine 
creative decree (from 4 and 6).92 
 
The first premise is a logical implication of divine omniscience, which was 
previously defined as God’s knowledge of all true propositions. If counterfactuals of 
freedom are true propositions and God does not know them, then God is not omniscient. 
The second premise is the most controversial, and objections to the premise will be handled 
later. For now, it will be assumed that it is true. The third premise states the logical 
alternatives: either God knows counterfactuals logically before or after the divine creative 
decree.  
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The fourth premise is also somewhat controversial, but there is plausible support 
for it. If God only knew counterfactuals of freedom after His creative decree, then He 
would be deciding what each person would do in every actual circumstance rather than 
having His middle knowledge be based upon what a person would do in every possible set 
of circumstances. In other words, “if God knows counterfactual truths about us only 
posterior to this decree, then there really are no counterfactuals of creaturely freedom. If 
there are such counterfactuals, they must be true logically prior to the divine decree.”93 
Given these four premises, then the rest of the argument logically follows; and since 
premise 7 is the definition of middle knowledge, it follows that Molinism is true. 
E. Critiques of Molinism 
 1. Biblical critiques. The first objections to Molinism are focused on the biblical 
evidence for God’s knowledge of counterfactuals of freedom. As was explained previously, 
there are only three or four passages of scripture that can plausibly be taken as evidence 
for divine counterfactual knowledge, but even these passages are disputed. Objectors argue 
that these passages are only rhetorical, and that God and/or Jesus is using the subjunctive 
mood to emphasize the point he is making. However, the Molinist can rightly point out that 
the burden of proof is on the skeptic to show that this language is only rhetorical; since no 
one has successfully made that case, it seems reasonable to recognize the biblical evidence 
for God’s counterfactual knowledge.94 
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94. This objection and the response to it is provided by Freddoso in his “Introduction,” 62-63. 
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 2. Theological critiques. In addition to the biblical objections, Thomists from 
Molina’s period raised three theological objections to Molinism that need to be addressed. 
The first objection focuses on the asymmetry thesis, which states that God relates to good 
and evil in two different ways. Normally the asymmetry thesis is understood as the 
intention/permission distinction, which argues that God intends good events to occur but 
only permits evil events to occur. Based on this distinction, Thomists argued that “God’s 
total causal contribution to free actions is nondetermining and hence that the very same 
causal influence on God’s part may result indifferently in either a good act or an evil act.”95 
Without this intention/permission distinction, God could be considered the author of both 
good and evil actions. 
 In response, it is important to distinguish between God’s concurrence and God’s 
grace. Every traditional Christian position has believed that “God’s general causal 
influence is required in order for secondary causes to bring about any effects whatever 
anywhere in the created world.”96 This cooperation with secondary causes is termed God’s 
general concurrence. For Molina, God concurrently upheld secondary causes by directly 
acting on the effect itself, in contrast to the Bañezian position that God acted directly on 
the secondary agent.97 Furthermore, Molina argued that God’s concurrence is intrinsically 
                                                     
 95. Freddoso, “Introduction,” 64. 
 
 96. Ibid., 17. 
 
97. The Bañezians were followers of the Dominican Domingo Bañez, who Freddoso describes as 
“Molina’s chief theological nemesis … who taught at Salamanca from 1577 to 1600 and was active in the 
official ecclesiastical inquiry into Molina’s writings” (134, note 13). They were Thomists who also accepted 
the reality of counterfactuals of freedom, but they argued that counterfactuals are located after the God’s 
creative decree, so that God decides which counterfactuals are true and which are false. For a broader 
discussion of the Bañezian position, see Freddoso, “Introduction”, 36-42. 
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neutral and is only rendered efficacious by the secondary causes, whereas Bañezians 
believed that God’s concurrence is intrinsically efficacious so that they could keep the 
intention/permission distinction intact.98 
 Rather than grounding the intention/permission distinction in God’s concurrence, 
Molina grounds it in God’s grace. Molina thinks that grace is a particular cause in contrast 
to the general causation of divine concurrence. He thinks that God’s grace inclines a person 
toward the good without causally necessitating their choice of the good. In other words, 
God may causally enable a person to choose the good and that person could still choose to 
make the evil choice. Consequently, the Molinist may still uphold the asymmetry thesis:  
when a good act is elicited, it is perfectly proper to say that it was elicited because 
of God’s grace acting as a cause that inclined the agent internally toward such an 
act. When an evil act is elicited, it is perfectly proper to say that God’s particular 
causal influence on the subject has been impeded, so that His only effective causal 
contribution to the act has been His general concurrence, which is intrinsically 
neutral in the strong sense and hence does not determine in any way the specific 
moral character of the act.99 
 
 A second Thomist objection invokes the principle of predilection, which states that 
no one would be better than another person unless he were loved and helped more by God. 
This objection argues that Molinism violates this principle, since two persons could be 
placed in the same circumstances and they would act differently, with the result that the 
one person may boast in his acceptance and use of God’s grace. Molinists may counter 
argue that this principle does still hold, since “it is God who gratuitously singles Peter out 
by arranging things in such a way that Peter will freely act well. By the same token, God 
                                                     
98. This explanation of concurrence, as well as the difference between Molinist and Bañezian 
conceptions of concurrence, are found in ibid., 17-18.  
  
99. This paragraph and the quotation may be found in Freddoso, “Introduction,” 64-65. 
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permits Judas to sin by allowing him to be so situated that, as God knows via middle 
knowledge, he will freely sin.” In other words, God is still giving more grace to some 
people instead of other people, which meets the criteria of the principle of predilection.100 
 The third theological objection involves petitionary prayer. The reader might recall 
a time in his or her life where a prayer was offered for a friend involving a request for that 
person’s salvation, a plea for that person to change a destructive habit, or a number of other 
things. If one accepts Molinism, then one must reconcile the conjunction of strong 
providential control and libertarian freedom. Since libertarian freedom maintains that one 
agent cannot causally determine another agent’s actions, Bañezians argued that if God 
cannot directly cause us to act in certain ways, then He could not effectively answer 
prayers, which means that Molinism diminishes the importance of prayer.101  
To answer this objection, two distinctions are in order. First, it is arguable that some 
aspects of conversion are the result of God’s direct causation (e.g. removing a heart of 
stone and replacing it with a heart of flesh, as described by Ezekiel 36:26) while others 
involve the will of the person converted (e.g. choosing to sin no more). In this way, 
Molinists could accept God’s direct causal influence while still holding to libertarian 
freedom. Second, one needs to distinguish between strong and weak actualization. When 
God strongly actualizes something, He directly causes it to occur; when He weakly 
actualizes something, He brings about the states of affairs which result from His direct 
causation of something else. Accordingly, whatever happens in conversion and 
                                                     
100. This objection and the quotation that responds to it come from Freddoso, “Introduction,” 66. 
  
101. Flint mentions this objection in Divine Providence, 110. 
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sanctification that does not involve human free will may be the result of God’s strong 
actualization, and whatever happens in conversion and sanctification that does involve 
human free will may be the result of God’s weak actualization. Thus, Molinism provides a 
plausible account of God’s interaction with humanity without diminishing the importance 
of prayer. 
3. Semantic and metaphysical objections. Although the biblical and theological 
objections to Molinism prove unsuccessful, many philosophical objections to Molinism 
have been raised ever since Plantinga reintroduced it in The Nature of Necessity. The most 
prominent objection to Molinism has been the “grounding” objection, which argues that 
counterfactuals of freedom lack metaphysical grounds and therefore cannot be true or false, 
meaning that God cannot know them. Robert Adams was the first modern philosopher to 
raise this objection in his 1977 article, “Middle Knowledge and the Problem of Evil.” To 
his mind, the only plausible metaphysical grounding of counterfactuals are the intentions, 
desires, and character of the persons mentioned in the counterfactual. However, traditional 
conceptions of libertarian freedom hold that a person may act against their character; thus, 
the only plausible counterfactuals would say that it is probable agent S would do action A, 
which fails to meet the Molinist criteria for counterfactuals that S would in fact do A.102 
While Adams’s analysis initially seems plausible, there are two problems that seem 
to undermine it. First, Wierenga points out that the proposition “Saul may act out of 
character” can be understood in two different ways: it either indicates an ability that Saul 
has (Saul has it within his power to act out of character), or it indicates a logical possibility 
                                                     
 102. Robert M. Adams, “Middle Knowledge and the Problem of Evil,” American Philosophical 
Quarterly 14, no. 2 (April 1977): 109-117, accessed June 25, 2016, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20009657. 
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(it might be that David stays in the city and Saul acts out of character, deciding not to 
besiege the city). It seems that Adams argument is that since either of these interpretations 
is plausible, it cannot be said that Saul’s intentions or character entails the certainty of the 
counterfactual. Yet this potential argument fails due to Adams’s own understanding of 
metaphysical grounding: 
Perhaps we can avoid settling that issue, however, if we recall that Adams is willing 
to allow that a causally sufficient condition can ground a proposition. Since a 
causally sufficient condition for the truth of a proposition need not entail the 
proposition, it seems clear that Adams does not require that a ground of a 
proposition entail the proposition. Hence, the fact that [Saul’s character and 
intentions] does not entail [the claim of the counterfactual] does not seem to show 
that it does not ground it.103 
 
If Adams himself thinks that lack of entailment does not necessarily result in lack of 
metaphysical grounding, then Molinist counterfactuals have metaphysical grounding as 
well even if they lack entailment. 
 Second, Freddoso argues that Molinist counterfactuals have metaphysical 
grounding like the grounding of absolute future contingents. A realist about the absolute 
future holds that a future-tense proposition has proper metaphysical grounds now if “there 
will be at some future time adequate metaphysical grounds for the truth of its present-tense 
counterpart p.” In other words, all that is necessary to metaphysically ground a future-tense 
proposition is that “some agent has caused or will cause the corresponding present-tense 
propositions to be true.” Subsequently, Freddoso argues that Molinist counterfactuals could 
be grounded in a similar way: “it seems reasonable to claim that there are now adequate 
metaphysical grounds for the truth of a conditional future contingent Ft (p) on H just in 
                                                     
103. The argument of this paragraph and the quote may be found in Edward Wierenga, The Nature 
of God: An Inquiry into Divine Attributes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), 141-143. 
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case there would be adequate metaphysical grounds at t for the truth of the present-tense 
proposition p on the condition that H should obtain at t.” Unless one wants to deny 
knowledge of the future, then one should accept the grounding of Molinist counterfactuals 
as well.104 
 Based on Freddoso’s argument, a formula for metaphysical grounding can now be 
created: “‘It X the case (Y) that z’ is now grounded iff it X the case (Y) that ‘z is now 
grounded.’” For instance, if one wants to know whether the statement “It might be the case 
that Donald Trump wins the presidential election in 2020” is grounded, then 
we need to look where the temporal or modal operator X tells us to look (into the 
past of our world, the future of our world, some other world), look precisely where 
the specifier Y tells us to look (three years ago, two months from now, the nearest 
world in which I offer Gore the bribe), and see if the present-tense proposition z is 
grounded there by the causal activity of some agent. If it is, the proposition in 
question is grounded; if it isn’t, the proposition is ungrounded.105  
 
This formula requires a proposition’s grounding to be determined by its proximity to the 
actual world; but what if a possible world where a person refrains from an action is equally 
proximal to the actual world as another possible world where the same person performs the 
same action? If the propositions “tie” in this way, then a false proposition has the same 
grounding as a true proposition. Since false propositions are not grounded, it supposedly 
follows that true propositions are ungrounded as well.106 
                                                     
104. The quotations in this paragraph are found in Freddoso, “Introduction,” 72-73. To read the 
whole argument, read pages 69-75. 
  
105. Both quotes are from Flint, Divine Providence, 134. The Trump example is my own. 
 
106. Ibid., 135. This same objection is also raised by David Hunt in “A Simple-Foreknowledge 
Response” in Divine Foreknowledge: Four Views, edited by J.K. Beilby and P.R. Eddy (Downers Grove, 
IL: InterVarsity Press, 2001), 153-154. 
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 Subsequently, both Plantinga and Flint have responded by appealing to primitive 
properties that apply to certain possible worlds rather than others: 
A Z-less world [where Z stands for an action in a possible world] may be no less 
similar to the actual world than is a Z-ful one if only fundamentally non-conditional 
propositions are considered. But if, as Plantinga contends, ‘one feature determining 
the similarity of worlds is whether they share their counterfactuals,’ then the Z-ful 
world may well be more similar to the actual world due to the fact that, both in it 
and in the actual world, (c  z) is true, whereas the same counterfactual is false in 
the relevant Z-less worlds.107 
 
Some have worried that such a response contradicts the standard semantics for 
counterfactuals, but Mares and Perszyk have shown that it does not, since these primitive 
properties “can help determine which closeness relations are appropriate for the assessment 
of [counterfactuals of creaturely freedom]. The semantics is still used to give a 
compositional theory of truth for counterfactuals.”108 Thus, this “primitive facts” view 
seems to adequately resolve the “tie” argument. 
 Nevertheless, the rebuttal of the “tie” argument results in the introduction of a 
metaphysical issue, commonly termed the “priority” problem. It essentially argues that God 
cannot know counterfactuals of freedom prior to His act of creation, rendering them useless 
for providential action in the world. I do not have the space to cover this objection here, 
but Plantinga gave a plausible response that seems to defuse the objection.109 
                                                     
107. Flint, Divine Providence, 135. Note that (c  z) would be false in Z-less worlds because the 
agent would choose to perform the action rather than refrain; he has the ability to refrain from Z, but chooses 
to perform Z instead, meaning that the Z-ful world contains the true counterfactual. 
  
108. Edwin Mares and Ken Perszyk, “Molinist Counterfactuals,” in Molinism: The Contemporary 
Debate, edited by Kenneth Perszyk (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 110. 
 
109. For formulations of the priority problem, see Hugh J. McCann, “The Free Will Defense,” in 
Molinism: The Contemporary Debate, edited by Kenneth Perszyk (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 
259, and Adams, “Middle Knowledge and the Problem of Evil,” 113-114. Plantinga’s reply may be found in 
“Replies to My Colleagues,” in Alvin Plantinga, edited by James Tomberlin and Peter van Inwagen 
(Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1985), 376. 
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4. Critiques of the conjunction between Molinism and libertarian freedom. Up 
until now, the objections examined have focused either on semantic issues or metaphysical 
grounding issues pertaining to counterfactuals of freedom. Thus far, it seems like those 
issues have been sufficiently rebutted by Molinists. Yet there is one category of objections 
not yet examined which focuses on Molinism’s adherence to libertarian freedom. 
Beginning with William Hasker in 1986, a slew of arguments and counterarguments have 
been written debating whether counterfactuals of freedom eliminate a person’s free will.110 
To keep things concise, only Hasker’s most recent version of the argument will be 
explained.  
To begin, Hasker defines the crucial notion of “bringing about” something: 
“A brings it about that Y iff [if and only if]: For some X, A causes it to be the case that X, 
and (X & H) ⇒ Y, and ~ (H ⇒ Y), where ‘H’ represents the history of the world prior to its 
coming to be the case that X and ‘⇒’ stands for broadly logical or metaphysical 
necessity.”111 Using this definition, and assuming that “□→” symbolizes the connective in 
a counterfactual, he builds the following argument: 
                                                     
 110. If the reader wishes to follow the paper trail, one may do so as follows: William Hasker, “A 
Refutation of Middle Knowledge,” Noûs 20, no. 4 (December 1986): 545-557; Freddoso, “Introduction,” 75-
78; Robert Adams, “An Anti‐Molinist Argument”, in James E. Tomberlin, ed., Philosophical Perspectives 5 
(1991): 343–53; William Lane Craig, “Robert Adams’s New Anti-Molinist Argument,” Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 54 (1994): 857-861; William Hasker, “Middle Knowledge: A Refutation 
Revisited,” Faith and Philosophy 12, no. 2 (April 1995): 223-236; William Hasker, “Explanatory Priority: 
Transitive and Unequivocal: A Reply to William Craig”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 
(1997): 389–93; William Lane Craig, “On Hasker’s Defense of Anti-Molinism,” Faith and Philosophy 15, 
no. 2 (April 1998): 236-240; Flint, Divine Providence, chapters 6 and 7; William Hasker, “A New Anti-
Molinist Argument,” Religious Studies 35 (1999): 291-297; and William Hasker, “Anti-Molinism is 
Undefeated!” Faith and Philosophy 17, no. 1 (January 2000): 126-131. 
 
111. This definition is originally found in Hasker, “A New Anti-Molinist Argument,” 291, but I 
found it in William Hasker, “The (Non-) Existence of Molinist Counterfactuals,” in Molinism: The 
Contemporary Debate, edited by Kenneth Perszyk (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 31. 
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1. Agent A is in circumstances C, the counterfactual of freedom ‘C □→ Z’ is true of 
her, and she freely chooses to do Z. (Molinist premise) 
2. A is in C, and it is in A's power to refrain from doing Z. (From premise 1 and 
definition of libertarian freedom) 
3. It is in A's power to bring it about that: A is in C, and A refrains from doing Z. (From 
premise 2) 
4. If it is in A's power to bring it about that P, and ‘P’ entails ‘Q’ and ‘Q’ is false, then 
it is in A's power to bring it about that Q. (Power Entailment Principle) 
5. (A is in C and refrains from doing Z) ⇒ (C □→ ~ Z). (Molinist premise) 
6. If it is in A's power to bring it about that A is in C and refrains from doing Z, and 
‘(C □→ ~ Z)’ is false, then it is in A's power to bring it about that (C □→ ~ Z). 
(From premises 4 and 5) 
7. It is in A's power to bring it about that (C □→ ~ Z). (From premises 1, 3, 6) 
8. It is not in an agent’s power to bring about the truth of the counterfactuals of 
freedom about her. 
9. It is not in A’s power to bring it about that (C □→ ~ Z). (From premise 8)112 
 
The crucial step in this argument is the move from premise 7 to premise 8. To 
support this move, Hasker claims that counterfactuals of world-actualization are an 
important part of God’s decision to create a world, and therefore are a key part of a world’s 
history. But if these counterfactuals are part of a world’s history, then “‘H’ does entail ‘C 
□→ X’, where ‘C □→ X’ is a true counterfactual of freedom. But if this is so, then we 
created free agents do not bring about the truth of counterfactuals of freedom about us; 
there is no possible world in which we do this.”113 Consequently, Hasker thinks that 
premise 8 is adequately supported, resulting in the impossibility of libertarian freedom. 
Thomas Flint disagrees with Hasker’s conclusion, arguing that his objection to 
Molinism fails even if one assumes that counterfactuals of freedom are included in a 
world’s history, such that “(BA*) A brings it about that Y iff: For some X, A causes it to be 
                                                     
 112. Premises 1-7 are on pages 31-32 of Hasker, “The (Non-) Existence of Molinist 
Counterfactuals”; premises 8 and 9 are on page 34 of the same chapter. 
 
113. Ibid., 33. 
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the case that X, and (X & H) ⇒ Y, and ~ (H ⇒ Y), where ‘H’ represents the history of the 
world (including all true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom) prior to its coming to be 
the case that X.”114 The fatal flaw of Hasker’s argument arises from the assumption that “if 
it's not possible that A brings it about that X, then it's not possible that A has the power to 
bring it about that X.”115 Using this assumption, Flint revises premises 6 and 7 of the 
argument to say that (6*) In no possible world does A bring it about that (C □→ ~ Z), and 
(7*) In no possible world does A have the power to bring it about that (C □→ ~ Z). This 
revision accurately captures Hasker’s assumption while maintaining the flow of the 
original argument, yet it also results in a contradiction; although 6* is true given the revised 
definition of “bringing about”, 7* is not true. This is because “(7*) amounts to the claim 
that (7) is true in no possible world. And as we've already seen, the Molinist will quite 
reasonably say that, given (BA*), (7) is in fact true—true in the actual world—and hence 
true in some possible worlds.”116 
If (6*) is true and (7*) is false, then Flint has derived a counterexample to Hasker’s 
assumption, thereby giving a reason to reject Hasker’s move from premise 8 to premise 9. 
In the end, Flint thinks that arguments like Hasker’s—those that try to invoke notions of a 
world’s history or numerous definitions of “bringing about”—miss the crucial issue of the 
whole debate. In Flint’s mind, the whole debate revolves around the Molina’s view that 
God’s middle knowledge depends upon what persons would do in actual circumstances: 
                                                     
 114. Thomas Flint, “Whence and Whither the Molinist Debate: A Reply to Hasker,” in Molinism: 
The Contemporary Debate, edited by Kenneth Perszyk (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 40-41. 
  
115. Ibid., 41. 
 
116. The revised versions of premises 6 and 7, as well as the quote, are from ibid., 42. 
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“Even though (C □→ Z) is true and A is in C, A still is able to do ~ Z. Had she done ~ Z, 
(C □→ Z) wouldn't have been true. Instead, (C □→ ~ Z) would have been true. So A has 
the power to do something (~ Z), such that, had she done it, a counterfactual that is true—
namely, (C □→ Z)—would have been false.”117 Molinists and anti-Molinists have argued 
fiercely over the plausibility of this position, but Flint thinks that revising the same 
arguments over and over again will move the discussion nowhere. 
In sum, Molinism has been the most biblically consistent and philosophically 
coherent position thus far. It has seemingly answered all objections, and provided a 
balanced way of accepting both strong providential control over creation and libertarian 
freedom. Nevertheless, it seems that some theological aspects of Molinism should be 
corrected. Most well-known Molinists, such as William Lane Craig, ardently hold to an 
Arminian view of soteriology, where God offers prevenient grace to all people so that they 
may choose to follow Him.118 By contrast, the author holds that the Reformed view makes 
better sense of the biblical data, and will therefore argue that Reformed Molinism provides 
the best option for maintaining a biblical soteriology and a coherent view of human 
responsibility.119 
                                                     
 117. Flint, “Whence and Whither the Molinist Debate,” 43. 
  
118. “Arminian-Wesleyan theologians concur with the Augustinian-Calvinist position that humans 
are unable to believe in Christ without the prior drawing of the Holy Spirit; however, they deny that this 
drawing is the same as regeneration. They instead maintain that this drawing is prevenient grace, or prior 
ability-supplying grace, that the Spirit gives to all humanity (John 12:32).” See Kirk R. MacGregor, 
“Regeneration,” in The Lexham Bible Dictionary, edited by John D. Barry et al. (Bellingham, WA: Lexham 
Press, 2016). 
 
 119. Admittedly, the Arminian-Calvinist debate over soteriology is one of the most contentious 
areas of Christian theology, so simply stating that the Reformed view better accords with the biblical data is 
questionable, to say the very least. To back this claim is far beyond the scope of this paper, so the reader 
should investigate the varying positions in due time. 
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III. The Author’s View 
 Calvin argued that the Fall resulted in the corruption of humanity’s reason and heart 
(i.e. intentions and character). This is central to the Christian religion, so it seems very 
unwise to deny this claim. He then argued that this corruption results in humanity’s 
inability to choose salvation in Christ and inability to even desire the good. This seems 
correct; humans have lost what Frame calls moral freedom.120 Yet the entailment between 
one’s loss of moral freedom and one’s loss of libertarian freedom is unclear. 
 Of course, a person’s moral freedom is what should be truly desired, since it allows 
people to seek after God and pursue Him wholeheartedly. Calvin thought that  
Man, since he was corrupted by the fall, sins not forced or unwilling, but 
voluntarily, by a most forward bias of the mind; not by violent compulsion, or 
external force, but by the movement of his own passion; and yet such is the 
depravity of his nature, that he cannot move and act except in the direction of 
evil.121 
 
Yet it is far from clear how the natural disposition of the human heart necessarily leads to 
a compatibilist account of human freedom. If a person (who was not empowered by God’s 
prevenient grace) performed an SFA, could they not choose between two conflicting 
reasons, both of which are evil? Is there any reason why this could not be the case, unless 
a person presupposed a compatibilist view of human freedom? 
 On the other hand, is this a possibility on the Molinist scheme? Molina himself held 
to a strong view of libertarian freedom, where “at [time] t [person] P contributes causally 
to [state of affairs] S only if (i) at t P contributes causally to S and (ii) P’s contributing 
                                                     
 120. Frame, The Doctrine of God, 135-136. 
  
121. John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion 2.3.5. 
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causally to S does not obtain at t by a necessity of nature and (iii) the total causal activity 
at t of causes other than P is compossible with P’s not causally contributing at t to S.”122 
Kane’s analysis could readily accept this definition as well; the only difference would be 
that the power of contrary choice is not necessary for every decision to be morally culpable, 
since PFAs and FWAs do not require this power. 
 By adopting Kane’s event-causal view, a nuanced view of human freedom begins 
to emerge. One may hold that many, if not all, desires and intentions arise from a corrupted 
will, so that one is naturally inclined towards wrongdoing. Next, one can grant that many 
decisions are the result of teleological guidance control, where one path is clearly more 
appealing than the other and one follows his desires without thought. These would be 
common actions which one (usually) puts little thought to: what food to eat, what music 
one enjoys listening to, and what clothes one chooses to wear. However, Christians also 
believe that God intervenes and imparts His prevenient grace, which inclines a person 
toward the good. It is at these moments, when God’s grace clashes with carnal nature, that 
self-forming acts occur.123 
 This clash of grace and human will is most visible at the moment of conversion. 
Through His middle knowledge, God knows that if a person is given enough grace and 
placed in the right circumstances, then that person would decide to accept Christ as his or 
her Lord and Savior. If God elects an individual to salvation, then His particular grace 
                                                     
122. Freddoso, “Introduction,” 27. 
  
123. Kane thinks of these clashes in primarily physical terms, where neural processes are clashing 
in the brain. While I would accept this clashing in the brain, I also hold that humans experience spiritual 
conflict, where “the spirit” and “the flesh” conflict with one another. Although this conflict readily 
accommodates to substance dualism, it could apply to a neo-Aristotelian metaphysic as well. 
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begins to change the person’s heart and he or she is drawn to Him. At the moment of 
conversion itself, God changes the person’s heart apart from any act of the person’s own 
will; since no one would ever decide to follow God without His help, God must change the 
spiritual orientation of a person’s soul. With the changed heart, the person now has two 
desirable options before him or her: choose God and follow His perfect plan, or reject 
God’s call and live a life of rebellion. Because God has placed the person in the set of 
circumstances where he would in fact choose Him, the person overcomes the 
indeterminacy in his neural processes and surrenders his life to Christ. 
 After conversion, there will be more opportunities for self-forming actions as part 
of the process of sanctification. The flesh and the spirit will continue to do battle, resulting 
in difficult choices. Nevertheless, God’s middle knowledge allows Him to place persons 
in the right circumstances so that they will choose Him over the desires of the flesh. Thus, 
He can guarantee that person’s perseverance throughout the rest of his life on earth. 
 Now this is a basic version of the author’s proposed model; to give it the proper 
nuance would go well beyond the scope of this paper. Still, this initial form captures both 
the biblical data and lived experience. In the life of a Christian, there is a tug-of-war 
between the desires of the flesh and the desires of the spirit that is readily incorporated into 
Kane’s view. Furthermore, it merges well with Molinism so that God still has strong 
providential control over His creation. In sum, Reformed Molinism expands Kane’s view 
by incorporating it into a Molinist framework and adding the conflict between flesh and 
Spirit to the already-existing clash between conflicting motivations or intentions, 
combining the best aspects of Molinism and Reformed soteriology.  
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IV. Conclusion 
 At their core, Arminianism and Molinism agree about the proper definition of 
divine foreknowledge. Both camps hold that the biblical evidence supports God’s 
completely and infallibly knowing the future; the difference arises when one addresses the 
implications of this definition. Arminians hold that divine foreknowledge alone is 
sufficient to explain God’s providential control over creation and the coherent conjunction 
of God’s sovereignty and human responsibility. However, it was shown that divine 
foreknowledge alone is incapable of supporting a strong theory of providential control, 
since it eliminates God’s ability to deliberate between options. By contrast, Molinism 
establishes a basis for strong providential control through its affirmation of divine middle 
knowledge, and it coherently maintains God’s sovereignty and human responsibility. 
Additionally, Reformed Molinism conjoins Robert Kane’s event-causal libertarianism with 
Molinism and Reformed soteriology to produce the most biblically consistent and 
philosophically/theologically coherent view available. 
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